Robert Gates, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, was right this week to replace the commander of both the International Security Assistance Force and the U.S. forces in Afghanistan with another general whose expertise is in unconventional warfare. It is surprising, however, that the Pentagon had not taken such a step before.
The effectiveness of a counterinsurgency strategy had already emerged in Iraq in the “surge” of 2007, under the Bush administration, particularly as expounded by General David Petraeus, now in charge of the U.S. Central Command.
The choice of General David McKiernan, who took command of ISAF in June, 2008, was not well adapted to the revised approach. His main experience had been as a commander of heavy armour brigades and divisions.
As ground forces commander in Iraq, Gen. McKiernan was right on the need for more “boots on the ground,” in opposition to Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary from 2001 to 2006. But he was not a good fit as commander for an Afghanistan campaign of counterinsurgency.
By contrast, his successor in Afghanistan, Lieutenant-General Stanley McChrystal, has quite different experience, as a green beret. In Iraq, he led such highly targeted operations as the capture of Saddam Hussein and the killing of the regional al-Qaeda terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Gen. McKiernan's Afghanistan appointments as ISAF and U.S. forces commander unfairly put him in a very difficult position, which led to his early replacement, unprecedented since General Douglas MacArthur's recall from Korea in 1951.
In accordance with his experience, Gen. McKiernan asked for a much larger number of troops, and was inclined to use overwhelming force rather than special operations.
The new approach calls for a comparatively small footprint that does not weigh heavily on day-to-day civilian life, and for well pinpointed missions, not aerial bombing of villages that inevitably kill non-combatants as well as Taliban fighters.
Mr. Gates was, however, correct in describing the new policy as more aggressive. ISAF personnel sent out with precise goals serve at greater risk to themselves, but also have a greater hope of achieving useful results.
Less conventional warfare, accepted by both the Bush and Obama administrations, is better. But the time lag in choosing a suitable commander in Afghanistan raises questions about the U.S. government's clarity and resolve. With some luck, Lieut.-Gen. McChrystal may yet be able to compensate for the delay.
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