Sunnis and Iraq's Election

We had hoped that the March 7 parliamentary elections would prove the growing maturity of Iraq’s fragile democracy and set the country on a stable path as American combat troops get ready for this summer’s planned withdrawal. Instead, the process unfolding is disgracefully unfair and roiling dangerous sectarian tensions.

Iraq’s Accountability and Justice Commission unleashed an electoral hand grenade this month when it disqualified some 500 (out of 6,500) candidates — many of them prominent Sunni Muslims — because of alleged ties to the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein. Among those ordered off the ballot: Defense Minister Abdul-Kader Jassem al-Obeidi and Saleh al-Mutlaq, one of Iraq’s most influential Sunni politicians. The decision was ratified last week by Iraq’s electoral commission.

Sunnis are understandably furious. After boycotting or battling the Shiite-dominated governments for much of the last seven years, Sunni leaders have been struggling to find a constructive new role.

The worst of Mr. Hussein’s henchmen should be held accountable for past repression. But there is little doubt that many if not most of the disqualifications are politically motivated and intended to disenfranchise Sunnis. Although Mr. Mutlaq openly solicits support from Mr. Hussein’s admirers, he was permitted to run for Parliament in 2005. And Mr. Obeidi has performed competently — and loyally — as defense minister.

The accountability commission is the successor to the destructive de-Baathification commission that sought to keep anyone with ties to Mr. Hussein out of government. Its chief, Ali Faisal al-Lami, is hardly an impartial judge. He is a candidate on the slate led by the Shiite leader Ahmed Chalabi, a relentlessly ambitious force in Iraqi politics who lured the Bush administration into the 2003 invasion and wants to be prime minister.

Both the accountability and the election commissions are part of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s government, and he issued a statement supporting their decisions. But American officials say Mr. Chalabi is the main manipulator. Mr. Chalabi’s absurd charge that the United States wants to return the Baath Party to power is typical of his divisive and destructive brand of politics.

There are other reasons to fault the process. Many Iraqis rightly question the legality of both commissions and their procedures, including a disturbing lack of transparency about who was disqualified and why. The ability to ban candidates is a serious authority that must be exercised openly, judiciously and rarely.

The Obama administration needs to keep pressing Iraqis to find a compromise that would allow the fullest list of candidates, including Mr. Mutlaq and Mr. Obeidi, to run. It still has leverage over Baghdad — including billions in aid and the ability to fulfill or deny the Iraqi government’s desire to purchase sophisticated weapons like F-16s. It must use that leverage. Iraqis have learned to play hardball politics. That is far better than fighting in the streets. But it should mean besting adversaries at the ballot box — not denying them the chance to run. If Sunnis are arbitrarily excluded, the entire election will be compromised. Even worse, the Sunnis may conclude, once again, that there is no role for them in Iraqi politics. That would be a disaster.

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