Sanctions against the regime aren't working.
Sunday's election in Burma, the first in 20 years, was never going to create radical change. But how we in the West respond to it matters.
We know the voting was neither free nor fair, and was marred by intimidation, vote-buying, ballot-stuffing and other serious irregularities. In any case, the 2008 constitution and electoral laws were rigged in favour of the country's military regime: a quarter of parliamentary seats were reserved for military officials. Burma's commander-in-chief retains wide-ranging veto powers and the authority to resume direct rule, guaranteeing the army's grip over the state regardless of who wins.
Several opposition parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) - the most popular party in the last elections, held in 1990 - boycotted the elections in protest.
In contrast, the military regime's front organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, operated freely using state resources, and was able to extort or buy votes with impunity.
The easy response to all this is to dismiss the election as a blatant attempt to legitimise military rule in an altered form that fooled no one. We will hear intensified calls for harsher international sanctions and more "action" through the UN to compel the regime to negotiate with the opposition, and for a commission of inquiry into war crimes in Burma.
This is the easy solution because it plays to our own sense of moral outrage and political superiority and allows political leaders to avoid difficult arguments with campaign groups who call for condemnation. But it exaggerates our ability to bring about decisive political change in Burma through external pressure.
Twenty years of escalating Western pressure on the junta has yielded virtually no concessions. If anything, it has reinforced the military's siege mentality. Burma has been torn by serious ethnic separatist insurgencies since decolonisation, and the army views itself as the only force capable of holding the country together. The army sees genuine democratisation as risking the country's dissolution. Holding all the cards, it will always insist on a slow transition to "disciplined" democracy.
But condemning any moves towards political liberalisation, however slight, as a "sham" provides no incentive for the military (or similar regimes elsewhere) to relax their grip at all - quite the reverse. Foreign intervention may even have encouraged Suu Kyi's NLD to adopt an inflexible stance in negotiations with the junta, despite its weak position. External pressure may have contributed to the deadlock in Burma.
Western policy towards Burma needs tempering with a new sense of realism. Given the massive power imbalance between the regime and its opponents, expecting any election to transform Burma into a liberal democracy would be unrealistic. The fact that 37 parties contested the elections shows there is no coherent anti-regime opposition capable of seizing power: The opposition is fragmented, politically and ethnically, and has been forcibly disorganised by decades of one-party military rule. The struggle for democracy in such conditions will be a lengthy, arduous process: It could not have been brought about by a single election, even one far freer than the one just held.
Many Burmese understand this better than some in the West. While several key parties and individuals boycotted the election, others chose to fight. This included many NLD activists frustrated with Suu Kyi's boycott decision, who broke away to form the National Democratic Force. Many ethnic minority parties also contested the election. These groups did not contest the election out of a naive sense that they would be free and fair; they did so out of political realism. They appreciated the massive constraints they faced and also their inability to change them, but were determined to struggle nonetheless, to widen the political space and promote their own interests as best they could. Their hope was to gain at least some official political representation, participate in dialogue, and fight to gradually ease restrictions on democratic freedom. Pro-democracy campaigners outside Burma have dismissed this effort, countering that even if oppositionists had managed to capture every seat in parliament, the military would still exercise veto power by virtue of the quarter of seats it allotted itself by amending the constitution, and the commander-in-chief's power to suspend democratic rule.
With such restrictions, the fight for democracy is far from easy. But this does not mean it is impossible or pointless, or that the Burmese people should abandon their efforts to liberate themselves and instead look to the international community to rescue them. This strategy has served the opposition poorly for two decades now. Western governments' sanctions and blandishments have had little effect. International pressure may cajole, prod or threaten, but cannot solve the fundamental problem in Burma - the weakness and profound fragmentation of anti-junta groups compared with the powerful, cohesive alliance of forces headed by the army. This does not mean that foreign governments should resign themselves to perpetual military rule in Burma. But it does mean they should adopt the same political realism demonstrated by the courageous opposition groups who were willing to struggle for freedom despite the odds, rather than wishing the odds were different. This might mean registering disappointment with the election but committing to work with a government of elected representatives on issues such as human rights and economic development or helping Burmese non-governmental organisations to work with Western agencies to deliver aid on the ground.
None of this will be easy. Much would have to be done with our eyes wide open and teeth firmly gritted. But we already do this with other dubious regimes, including Burma's neighbours. China, Laos and Vietnam are one-party dictatorships that are nowhere near holding multi-party elections, yet we enjoy far warmer relations with them than with Burma. Singling out Burma as a pariah may salve consciences in the West, but is it helping those who really matter, the Burmese people?
