U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates will visit China next week, seeking to improve strained relations between Washington and Beijing. He faces an uphill task, as a new realism about China has descended on the U.S. capital.
Years of waiting for China to play a more constructive global role have given way to the realization that American and Chinese national interests may simply be too divergent for the two to create a meaningful partnership. Though few will admit it, the new China realism is a good thing. It will allow Washington and its allies to better respond to the array of challenges China poses and will help define norms of acceptable behavior in the vast Indo-Pacific region. Paradoxically, it may also allow for greater cooperation between Washington and Beijing, though without the rose-colored glasses that until recently clouded America's vision, and only if China's leaders recognize the chance they have to end the distrust they themselves have engendered.
China's growing assertiveness in security issues has been a source of concern to many for years, yet only recently has it caught the attention of some observers. This new realism was brought about by China's own actions, including its continued resistance to condemning North Korea's attacks on South Korea and its warnings against U.S. naval exercises in East Asian waters.
Yet perhaps the tipping point was Beijing's refusal to let jailed Nobel Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo or any members of his family attend the Nobel ceremonies in Oslo last month. There could be no clearer evidence of the fundamental differences between China's political system and America's than the empty chair that represented Liu on the Nobel stage.
Washington's new realism is finally catching up with much of the rest of the Indo-Pacific region. Both openly and in private, officials in countries from Japan to India have been warning U.S. bureaucrats of their concerns about China's growing power and influence. China's maritime assertiveness against Japan, Vietnam and Indonesia has raised tensions in the region over the past year.
This has led Japan to revise its decades-old defense policy to focus on threats to its southern territories, those near China, and to commit to increasing its submarine and air capabilities. India is in the midst of a major naval buildup as Chinese naval ships regularly transit the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian nations look to the United States as a counterweight to China's increased presence in shared waters.
America's concerns are growing, too. Last week, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Robert F. Willard, revealed that China's new anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, has reached initial operating capability, thus raising the possibility that U.S. aircraft carriers and other large ships could be vulnerable in the future to land-based attacks.
China's new fifth-generation stealth fighter, revealed this week, is more advanced in production than many had believed. It may contest air supremacy with the F-22, whose production was stopped last year by the Obama administration. On the political front, State and Defense Department spokesmen are using harsher language in demanding that China start reining in North Korea.
So how is the new realism a good thing? For one thing, Washington can now develop a clearer understanding of Beijing's perceived interests. China's massive military buildup has been watched by the U.S. armed forces, but often ignored in the capital.
With no obvious threat to China, why has the country modernized its military forces, building dozens of submarines, hundreds of short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles, and advanced fighter aircraft? What national goals are these offensive weapons systems designed to achieve? Having a clear-eyed understanding of China's capabilities and goals will allow the United States and its allies to defend their interests.
Secondly, understanding that Beijing does not share many of the same interests as the United States and its allies should lead to a revitalized set of alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. Nations that share certain goals on human rights, the rule of law, civil society and the like should consider banding together more regularly to discuss issues of common concern. Continuously extending a hand to China when the hand is often rebuffed simply misses opportunities to promote liberal norms and enhance democratic systems around the region. Moreover, bickering between Washington and its partner in Tokyo over U.S. troops should diminish as the concern over China rises.
Third, as nations of the region start to band together to protect their interests and to assert a standard of common behavior, Beijing may begin to alter its behavior, as well. For too long, China has taken advantage of the perception that it was the next great power to act in ways that degraded regional stability. That should come to an end as a new realism takes hold in capitals from Delhi to Tokyo.
By making clear to China's leadership that it needs to work with the regional order now in place, and not seek to substitute another one, the liberal nations of the Indo-Pacific will increase stability and the chance that China will recalculate its national goals. Beijing should recognize that its future interests lie not in its oft-claimed "peaceful rise," but in a new "cooperative rise."
Such realism will restore a sense of balance to the Indo-Pacific region. It will assure nations large and small that freedom of the seas and skies will be maintained. It will reduce the expectations all have on China to play a leading role in coming years. It will make political cooperation among liberal nations more robust and influential.
What is needed is a continued realistic view and the courage not to accommodate in the face of Chinese demands counter to the maintenance of public order. For all its drawbacks of leaving behind grand visions of a responsible stakeholder, this new approach may lead to a China we can live with.
