In Egypt, the main coercive force is the national army, which was impartial when the 2011 uprising began and then eventually nudged Mubarak out the door. In Iran, the main coercive force is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which controls the Basij (a pro-government militia), the intelligence services, the security forces, and hundreds of businesses. When the Iranian pro-democracy demonstrations erupted, the IRGC stood firmly behind Khamenei and carried out bloody massacres.
The Egyptian protests forced the closure of schools, banks, the stock exchange and many other prominent institutions, devastating tourism and the national economy. The shutdowns also heightened pressure on Egyptian officials to resolve the crisis quickly and peacefully. In Iran, oil revenues are not affected by street protests, unless there is a strike among oil workers or other countries increase the stringency of sanctions.
Egypt is compelled by its economic and financial systems to maintain good relations with the outside world - especially with the United States, which gives Cairo roughly $2 billion in economic aid each year. Iran has championed a violent, ideologically driven crusade against the West in general and America in particular. Unless sanctions dramatically reduce Iranian oil revenue, the government will not bow to international demands.
Indeed, while the Mubarak regime was highly sensitive to Western opinion, the Iranian regime simply accuses its critics of being U.S. agents. Thus, Egypt allowed foreign media to stay in the country during its 2011 protests, but Iran expelled all foreign reporters at the outset of its 2009 protests.
In Egypt, the opposition groups easily agreed on a common objective: the overthrow of Mubarak. Back in 2009, the Iranian opposition groups were so divided that they could not reach such an agreement. Today, however, the Green Movement has coalesced around the twin, simple goals of deposing Khamenei and forcing the regime to allow free, fair elections.
The combined effects of the Arab Spring and domestic economic stagnation have contributed enormously to delegitimizing the Iranian theocracy in the eyes of the public. The Greens have also made substantial progress in bolstering solidarity across opposition groups, cultivating democratic unrest, and causing schisms within the regime. They have made much less progress in fostering dissent and division among IRGC members, who remain the bulwark of government stability.
In the months and years ahead, the toughest, but most critical, challenge for the Green Movement will be splitting senior IRGC officials from the regime. Even if the Greens can broaden their coalition and establish more robust neighborhood networks, they will not achieve their ultimate aims until they disable the machinery of repression. When that finally happens, the real Persian Spring will arrive.
