For this reason, Ambassador Ford should be recalled now, to demonstrate a final break with the Assads, or he should be deployed repeatedly, as he was in Hama, to symbolize America's support for the opposition. For the same reason the U.S. should be far more active in turning Assad and his closest supporters into international pariahs, using whatever multilateral bodies are available and employing far sharper presidential rhetoric than we have yet seen. Assad and his family should be offered one last chance to get out now before the wheels start turning that will make him an international outlaw forever.
Second, we should put far more pressure on the Syrian business community-Sunni, Christian and Alawite-so that it increasingly sees the Assads as a bottomless drain on the nation, not a bulwark against chaos. This means working harder to get international cooperation on additional sanctions that would hit Syrian imports and exports, rather than targeting only the finances of a few top officials close to Assad.
Finally, the U.S. should be pressing the Syrian opposition-the traditional leadership inside the country (at least those still out of prison), and the new groups such as those that met recently in Turkey-to state with greater clarity their commitment to civil peace when the Assads are gone. They should pledge that post-Assad Syria will protect all minorities-the Alawites, Kurds and the very nervous Christian communities. They should agree now to an international role in providing these protections and guarantees. The more detailed these pledges are, and the more publicity and international support they get, the more good they will do inside Syria.
But for all the justified focus on Syria, the single event that would most help bring down the Assads would be the fall of Moammar Gadhafi in Libya. It still isn't clear today if the lesson of the Arab Spring is that dictators are doomed or that dictators willing to shoot peaceful protesters can win. Once Gadhafi goes, the oxygen Libya is sucking from the Arab struggle for democracy will circulate again. The NATO effort-however poorly implemented-will have finally been a success, and threats of possible military action to prevent civilians, especially refugees, will have some credibility.
Meantime, much can be done to avoid a sectarian war in Syria if the Assad mafia can be separated from much of its own sectarian support. We can use our voice and influence to persuade Syria's minorities that they have a secure future after Assad is gone-and help all of Syria's communities agree on the rules for the post-Assad era that is coming.
