By deploying the newest tools of Facebook and Twitter, the disparate, atomized opposition could stage large anti-regime demonstrations. Use of social media continues on varying scales in Yemen, Egypt and Syria. The internet is by now such an integral part of business and industry in the region that no government can afford to close it down for too long.
But this instrument is proving to be double-edged. Witness, for instance, the emergence of the Syrian Electronic Army, disabling opposition websites and hacking into Facebook pages of dissidents. After the much publicized July visit to the dissident city of Hama by US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford, the electronic army hacked into the US embassy's Facebook page and posted pro-government slogans.
This is one reason why the regime of President Bashar Assad has withstood four-month-long pressure from the street. The key reason, however, is the continuing loyalty of the military high command to Assad based on their common affiliation to the Alawite Shiite sect. By lifting emergency rule and allowing demonstrations cleared by the authorities in advance, the regime has enabled its backers to argue that Assad is a reformer. Many Syrians also fear that if their country were to adopt the sort of democracy the US brought to Iraq, Syria, too, would descend into a debilitating inter-sectarian civil war.
The defection of senior generals in Tunisia and Egypt brought about the downfall of their presidents. Where the armed forces high command is divided, as in Yemen, a stalemate has resulted between the camps favoring and opposing President Ali Abdullah Saleh, recovering in a Saudi hospital from injuries sustained in an attack on his palace in Sanaa.
Though freedom of assembly was won by the sacrifices made by the opposition, it has lost the monopoly it enjoyed initially. Emulating their rivals, regime supporters in Syria and Yemen also have taken to the streets.
Even in Egypt, where revolution is supposed to have triumphed, pro-democracy activists are now realizing it was naïve to accept at face value the commitment to social justice, civil liberties and democracy from SCAF, headed by Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, Mubarak's defense minister for 20 years.
The SCAF's declaration seemed to be directed as much at placating the United States, an annual source of more than $2 billion and advanced weaponry, as the demonstrators in Cairo's Tahrir Square. It also pacified the growing minority among its ranks that was critical of Hosni Mubarak's plan to pass on power to his son.
Little wonder that the SCAF is resisting pressure to put on trial those civilian and military officials of Mubarak's regime accused of corruption and killing of peaceful protestors.
After five eventful months it is dawning upon the leaders of the Tahrir Square sit-in that the SCAF has a vested interest in preserving as much of the political-economic structure of the Mubarak era as it can. Under the tutelage of Field Marshall President Anwar Sadat and Mubarak, the military acquired farms, factories and hotels. Estimates of its assets vary from 10 to 30 percent of the economy.
Those who have taken to the streets in Cairo are rightly targeting the SCAF. During a recent march on the defense ministry, protesters were assaulted by pro-SCAF thugs wielding knives, swords and Molotov cocktails. On 1 August, the SCAF promulgated a decree banning protests. Army troops fired in the air to disperse the three-week long sit-in by peaceful protestors.
The de facto freedom of association in Egypt has led to a mushrooming of political factions, enlarging the SCAF's area of maneuver. SCAF has the power to set the agenda and play one group of politicians against another.
The young, secular initiators of the street protest are now realizing the vast gap that exists between their success in assembling crowds and establishing political parties, grounded into a practical ideology, with a nationwide network. To their dismay, they find that they cannot match the Muslim Brotherhood. Established in 1928, it has continued to maintain deep roots in society despite long periods of repression.
Those who raise the prospect of an alliance between the Brotherhood and the SCAF are overlooking the fact that it was the military in Algeria that brutally crushed the Islamic Salvation Front after it won four-fifths of the parliamentary seats in the first round in December 1991. Aware of the subsequent decade-long bloody chapter in the Algerian history, Brotherhood leaders have decided to contest less than 50 percent of the parliamentary seats if and when elections are held.
The final test of a democratic system is the subservience of the military to the elected civilian authority. Politicians of all hues face a long struggle ahead to achieve that goal.
Revolutionaries are discovering that overthrowing dictators was perhaps the easiest part of a long struggle.
