In this perspective, the narrative of German success with which this article began is a chimera. At a deeper level, Germany has no real narrative for itself, let alone for Europe - and thus not for the relations between the country and the EU. It therefore cannot play the role that it once enjoyed and was long expected of it: of forging a bold vision of Europe and leading (or at least co-leading) the European Union in that direction.
The public criticism of the government's failure over Europe by two political heavyweights, former chancellor Helmut Kohl(once Angela Merkel's patron) and former foreign minister Joschka Fischer, shows how acute this predicament has become.
The side theatre
Germany's European drift has many dimensions. Domestic discussion of the euro crisis - especially the heated argument over whether the issuing and backing of "Eurobonds" is the solution - is revealing. For it reveals less a genuine engagement with Europe than a local political calculus: would this really allow Germans to end our bottomless commitment to pay the debts of greedy partners in southern Europe, and thus save ourselves and the European economy?
The ruling of Germany's constitutional court at Karlsruhe on 7th September 2011, finding that Germany's contributions to the European bailout programme are constitutional, has a twofold implication: that the European system has sufficient legitimacy for the Bundestag to vote for the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), but clearly not enough to go down the route of any supranational debt-backing (and Eurobonds are nothing else). The latter definitely would require a change of treaty both at the European level and subsequently of Germany's Grundgesetz (basic law).
The (legitimate) German Angst in this discussion is the question of how long a Germany that used the Eurobond route as a way of serving its own interests could survive if other eurozone states continued to sink. In this sense, Germany is asking not whether supranational debt backing (with all its possible political consequences) could work for Europe, but whether Germany is strong enough to throw the life raft of Eurobonds to Europe (or instead risks sinking with its partners).
A year ago, I wrote an article for openDemocracy examining Germany's European dilemma in terms of the country's desire to break free from Europe and "go global" (see "Germany goes global: farewell, Europe", 14th September 2010). Now, after a series of emergency packages and bailouts that has failed to calm the financial storms, the Eurobond question has come to dominate the German and European debate (even though the option is still politically excluded by Ms. Merkel). The continued lack of an alternative vision suggests that a weakened Germany may now in fact be unable either to save the euro or to go it alone.
A leading European country that has no social vision or national narrative cannot have either for Europe. This helps explain why Angela Merkel is reluctant to take any decisive step over Eurobonds: it would inevitably entail a firm statement of Germany's position over more economic and political integration in Europe (a process in which Eurobonds would be one - but only one - element). Germany's paralysis on these big questions is both a German and a European tragedy.
Against this backdrop, German discussion on the eurozone (and now over Eurobonds) seems to be side theatre to the more profound question of the future of Germany's status as an "island of the blessed" in the middle of Europe. Will its growing problems (such as excluded young people) create a dynamic where Germany's social fabric and democratic health becomes as vulnerable as those of some of its neighbours?
The tipping point
The political ideal inspiring the euro was that a common European currency could serve as an instrument strong enough to surf the waves of international financial turmoil, and act among them as a force for stability (I worked for Jacques Delors and can confirm that this is what he meant!).
If it has never realised its potential, this is partly because the European left (starting with Tony Blair and his "third way", followed by Gerhard Schröder's "agenda 2010"), made "economic and monetary union" (EMU) and the euro itself prey to the ravenous financial markets - rather than using it as a tool to build a stronger European democracy based also on a "social" in addition to a "market" conception of the state.
This missed opportunity means that the original conception has become trapped in complexities, albeit important (such as the insane shifts from work rents to capital rents, institutional flaws that overlooked endemic tax evasion and corruption in Greece, and other aspects of moral hazard).
This evolution, which the financial crisis of 2008-11 has accentuated, long ago turned the euro into a scapegoat for German public opinion. The scapegoat might now be killed, in part because that seems much easier than correcting or containing the all-powerful financial markets through better regulation.
The only way to prevent this is through a return to the primacy of politics, where both a radical market logic and an easy populism are kept at bay. This would make the euro the European tool it was always meant to be, and put the question of what Germany really wants of Europe and of itself at the centre of the agenda. Germany remains the tipping point country for the future of Europe and the eurozone - despite itself.
