The members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) have stated from the very beginning that their role was purely transitional, promising elections and a return to civilian rule in six months. In reality, the period of openly military rule is going to last much longer. Parliamentary elections are scheduled to start on November 28, and, with three rounds of People’s Assembly elections and three of Shura Council elections, they will not end until early March. It will be late March by the time the two chambers of parliament can hold a joint meeting to choose the members of the committee to draft the constitution, a process likely to take months. The constitution will then be submitted to a referendum and the presidential elections will take place only after this entire process is completed. The rule by the SCAF is unlikely to end before late 2012 or, most probably before 2013.
Nevertheless, the SCAF continues to define itself as an interim body. There are indications that it is uneasy about its openly political role and would like to surrender it. It is less clear, however, that it is willing to relinquish its “behind the scenes” role. The situation is difficult to read. The SCAF has shown a propensity for making unilateral decisions without consulting political parties and civilian organizations. For example, after a referendum approved a narrow set of constitutional amendments, the SCAF took it upon itself to incorporate the amended articles with articles culled from the old constitution to produce an interim charter; in July, it amended the election law without public consultations. It is true that when political parties and movements protest, the military usually meets with them and responds to some of the complaints, but it is clear that SCAF members remain, at the heart, a military elite comfortable with issuing orders, not consulting.
Adding to the ambiguity about the intentions of the SCAF—or at least of some of its members—is the suspicion that Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi, who heads the SCAF, is considering running for the president, perpetuating the tradition that the Egyptian president must be a military man. In view of Tantawi’s age—he was born in 1928—and his long association with Mubarak, the candidacy may appear unlikely, but the persistence of the rumor says a lot about the fears of many Egyptians that the military has no plans to relinquish its grip on power and will prolong the life of the old regime—without Mubarak and his sons.
The National Democratic Party
The possibility of a revival of the NDP worries many Egyptians—and conversely nurtures the hopes of others. The party was officially disbanded in April 2011 after two attempts to give it new credibility and keep it alive under new leadership. But up until this point, the military has not banned former members or even leaders of the NDP from political activity. The decision may be revisited: in response to repeated demands by other political parties and protest groups, Tantawi stated recently that the military is studying the possibility of reactivating a Nasser-era “treason law” to bar former NDP members or its leaders from political activity, but it is unclear what this law will entail and how far its reach will be. The old political elite are by no means out of the game yet.
The launch of new political parties by prominent members of the old NDP makes it clear that the old elite are fighting back. The return of NDP notables to politics is also facilitated by the fact that one-third of the seats in both the People’s Assembly and Shura Council will be filled by a first-past-the-post system rather than proportional representation; such system is particularly favorable to independent candidates and particularly to those who have strong local ties and support in a specific constituency, as is the case with many former NDP members.
The Protesters
The role of youth organizations was key to bringing down the Mubarak regime. It was the activists of the April 6 Youth Movement and the members of the “We are all Khaled Saeed” Facebook page and others who organized the first demonstrations on January 25. They were soon joined by youth from many other organizations. The Revolutionary Youth Council, which emerged even before Mubarak was deposed, brought together representatives from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Youth Movement for Justice and Freedom, the April 6 Youth Movement, the campaign to support Mohamed ElBaradei, the National Association for Change, the youth wings of the Democratic Front, al-Karama, Tagammu’ and al-Ghad parties, as well as independent activists. It is a loose coalition at best, since youth movements refuse strict hierarchical organization and well-defined leadership roles, but it has repeatedly proven its capacity to mobilize people.
Even as Egypt moves toward elections, the youth organizations and, more broadly, the people willing to go out and demonstrate in the streets remain an important feature of the political scene in Egypt. But the impact is unclear. At their best, protesters act as the conscience of the revolution, challenging the decisions of the SCAF and occasionally the willingness of political parties to go along with them. At their worst, protesters become a dangerous force, seeking to press the government into hasty decisions that may harm the transition. What is certain is that protesters remain an established part of the political process in today’s Egypt.
The Next Few Months
During the next several months, the relative weight of these players should become clearer, but as this happens conflict could increase in Egypt. The elections will of course provide the first indication of the support enjoyed by the various parties and put an end to endless speculation, but, if Islamists should get a high percentage of the vote, election results could also create a lot of strife in the country and possibly encourage the military to continue exercising power overtly. Election results could lead protest movements to fade away, at least temporarily, or to become mobilized again if they deem that elections reconfirmed the power of the old regime.
At this point, it is clear who the participants in Egypt’s political game are. It will be several more months before we understand their relative strength and considerably longer to know whether the emerging balance of power will allow a democratic transformation.
