Third, from a pure political engineering standpoint, the ideological debates that might move South Korea toward nuclear-weapons capability would likely arise during the heat of the elections season next year. By contending that the five other member states in the long-stalled Six-Party Talks, except North Korea, have been using the wrong approach, extreme conservative pundits are likely to demand Lee Myung-bak, whose term ends in February 2013, to give the next president political space and diplomatic support on the possibility of developing a nuclear-weapons program. In the context of an asymmetric nuclear-weapons structure, according to these hardliners, the appropriate response should include concerted efforts to make the form of deterrence perfectly protective of Seoul's defense nets. Without having a ready formula for this cost-benefit analysis, many people in Seoul also vaguely assume that the desire for nuclear weapons can be an insurance policy in the world of international politics, a way of righting decades of historical wrongs. They point to the fact that South Korean leaders, for domestic political reasons, used to take bold positions contrary to Washington's, lest they appear to be America's lapdogs. But doing Washington's bidding is not the point. What is crucial for a rational assessment of such choices is the will and practical capabilities of South Koreans to open the Pandora's box called the nuclear- weapons program. If South Koreans approve, it has been suggested by one South Korean engineering professor that the nation is technically capable of producing a nuclear weapon in six months.
Fourth, South Korea's denuclearization policy is fundamentally predicated on good relations with the US. Unfortunately, the ROK-US alliance is in tatters. Instead of cementing the mutual partnership, the US openly supported calling the disputed body of water between Korea and Japan the "Sea of Japan" rather than "East Sea." The sharp differences over the revisions of the controversial ROK-US atomic agreement, which expires in 2014, show another widening crack. A growing number of South Koreans no longer have absolute confidence in American backing. These changes of perception are the result of a paradigm shift for the alliance that both countries have enjoyed over 50 years. This is not unexpected.
While Seoul cannot afford an open break with Washington, it has reason to put some distance between itself and its long patron. Some radicals even insist that the only way to understand events is to cause them, even though this would precipitate a severe crisis in Washington-Seoul relations and a disastrous situation on the peninsula. Unrefined utterances in favor of pursuing nuclear weapons are unnecessarily unsettling peace and stability on the peninsula. An insatiable appetite for weapons of mass destruction is likely to turn the peninsula-at-armistice into a powder keg.
These points are not meant to minimize the existent threats emanating from North Korea's nuclear weapons, but rather to plead in favor of the need for sophistication in eliminating the nuclear threats per se.
Assuming that America's ability to direct regional events is strikingly in decline and the devaluation of US power is not good for coherence and development in the region, the US and South Korea must reach an agreement on the future direction for the alliance. The US must invest in more diplomacy with South Korea and relay the unspeakable truth - the time has come for South Koreans to stop chasing the ghosts of a former superpower.
Convincing South Korea that it can protect itself by nuclear weapons alone is like hoodwinking people into thinking that they can live by drinking only water. Unlike water, nuclear weapons have little to do with survival.
