Various navies remain deployed off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean, including the international deployments of Operation Atalanta of EUNAVFOR, Operation Ocean Shield of NATO and the US-led Combined Task Force 151 as well as independent deployments from countries such as China, Japan, India, Iran and Russia. While such forces have been extremely active in counter-piracy efforts, the area of ocean to be patrolled, more than one million sq km, makes it an impossible task to monitor all shipping and prevent all possible attacks. As a result, the shipping industry is turning to private security firms to fill the gap.
The Maersk Alabama was an early example: after she was hijacked in 2009, her owners stationed armed guards on board (although Maersk Line did not employ armed guards as a matter of course on other vessels). However, a major change has occurred this year, especially after shipowners' association the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) changed its stance, acknowledging that: 'In view of the current crisis in the Indian Ocean ship operators must be able to retain all possible options available to deter attacks and defend their crews against piracy.' Some shipping lines were already quietly arming their vessels, but became much more open about it afterwards, including China's largest shipping company COSCO and Bahamian-registered Clipper Ferries/Ro-Ro.
The tide of government opinion also seems to be turning, with Norway, Italy, India and Britain all recently issuing guidelines or passing legislation to allow armed guards on merchant vessels under their flags. Germany and Cyprus are contemplating the same, while the major flags of convenience, Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, do not oppose the practice.
Captain Keith Blount, EUNAVFOR chief of staff, said in September that the force was 'completely agnostic' about the use of armed guards. However, there are some worries - including among crews - that the presence of armed guards on board may lead to more violence.
Further, there are logistical difficulties in embarking armed personnel. While Indian Ocean countries such as Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Oman, Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar have drawn up regulations for the landing of armed guards and storage of weapons at their ports, some ports do not allow or place strict regulations on armed guards on board when a vessel docks there. In South Africa, crew have been arrested for firearms violations even when the presence of armed guards was declared by the master. Egypt briefly banned vessels carrying armed security from the Suez Canal, and now requires a declaration of weapons aboard.
Nevertheless, no vessel carrying armed guards has yet been hijacked, and for many shipowners this is the clinching argument. Peter Cook, a spokesman for the Security Association for the Maritime Industry, earlier estimated that 20% of shipping companies operating in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden would hire armed guards by the end of 2012.
Pirates' new tactics
One constituency that will not be able to take advantage of these relaxed restrictions on the use of armed guards is private yachts and tourists in coastal resorts. This remains a concern as the recent European kidnappings suggest these softer targets may be becoming increasingly attractive to pirates.
Hostages are potentially useful to pirates not only because of their potential monetary value (albeit lower than the ransoms that can be commanded for a ship), but also because they are far easier to capture and move than a tanker. Beyond the European hostages taken from Kenya in October, a South African yacht, Choizil, was captured off the coast of Tanzania in November 2010. Two South Africans are still in captivity, and according to Colonel John Steed, until recently the head of the UN's counter-piracy unit, they are being held by al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist militia group. Conversely, American and Danish aid workers captured recently in the town of Galkayo were in the hands of pirates, who have demanded a $10m ransom for them.
This highlights another trend: a growing synergy between the pirate gangs and al-Shabaab, who still control much of central and southern Somalia. Although they remain very different groups with separate aims - one purely commercial, the other political/ideological - overlaps occur in their interests and activities. The crippling famine in Somalia and al-Shabaab's withdrawal from its strongholds in the capital, Mogadishu, in August, have created a funding shortage for the group, which they have been trying to fill by taking a percentage of pirates' ransom money. In February, Reuters reported al-Shabaab seized several pirate leaders in Haradhere and forced them to agree to hand over 20% of future ransoms. An investigation by the news agency found large payments going to al-Shabaab's 'marine office' after lucrative ransoms were handed over for released ships. Pirates' growing use of the insurgent-controlled port of Kismayo has allowed for taxation and limited cooperation between the groups.
