Among the less-noticed aspects of the Arab Spring have been the consequences of the deteriorating outlook for Syria for the Palestinians, on one hand, and for Hezbollah, on the other. Hamas is proving adept at riding the strongly Islamist political current. By failing to do so, Hezbollah is losing its credibility with the wider Arab street.
Hamas is a skilful practitioner of politics as well as carefully calibrated violence. As befits an organisation with strong historical connections in Gaza to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it is playing its political cards adroitly. Its leader in Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, has affirmed in Cairo the intimacy of the relationship with the politically ascendant Brotherhood. Meanwhile, the Hamas leadership presence in Syria has been reduced to a bare minimum. It has indicated (while also formally denying it to be the case) that it may be willing to transfer its headquarters to a more politically acceptable location than Damascus.
There is a subtler subtext. At issue is not the prospect of a genuine relocation of Hamas headquarters to another Arab country such as Egypt or Qatar. Dealings with Egypt have been reasonably productive. Hamas can expect, at the very least, more even-handed treatment than it experienced from the Mubarak regime. Qatar has wealth, some interest in Islamist agendas and an activist but indecipherable foreign policy Hamas could hope to exploit.
But the Palestinians have learned from bitter experience the perils of being beholden to any Arab regime or becoming entangled in inter-Arab squabbles.
In the present political climate the key objectives of Hamas are to be seen to distance itself as far as possible from the bloodletting with which the image of the Syrian leadership is indelibly tarnished and to position the organisation to capitalise on the opportunities unfolding for it in a more popularly empowered regional political environment.
At a minimum, Islamist electoral success in Tunisia and Egypt and the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi will reshape the social and political direction of those countries in ways that were unimagined under their former regimes. In Egypt, provided it can contain the rise of its pietist political rivals, the Brotherhood will be well placed to advance its domestic political and constitutional agenda, and to secure its gains.
As the new mainstream of Arab politics, the Muslim Brotherhood and its regional counterparts will have a reasonable chance of building normalised relations with Europe and even the US, especially so long as its private assurances in regard to maintaining stable dealings with Israel are found to be credible. That can only work to the advantage of Hamas. In addition, Hamas will benefit from the scepticism of the Palestinian street that a two-state solution can be found with Israel, while the Palestinian Authority will suffer.
Where Hamas has been astutely separating its popular standing from the violence of the Syrian regime against its own citizens, but without making a break with either the regime or Iran, Hezbollah has been simplistic and outspoken in defence of the Assad regime. It is driven to do so not by the limits to its authority arising from its symbiotic relations with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Hezbollah possesses the physical means of maintaining its grip on Lebanon's political future. It is entrenched beyond any prospect of extrication from the social fabric of Lebanese Shia. Only a couple of years ago, Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah was more popular on the street than any Arab leader. Citing security concerns (after all, it did no harm to his image to promote the notion he was a prime Israeli target), he cultivated a mystique of seclusion from his adoring audience. Now he has been reduced to appearing in public to bolster his flagging support. And still he is being scorned for displaying a lack of principle when the blood of fellow Arabs is being shed.
Hamas is careful in calculation of its political interests, as well as having regard to the financial and other consequences of its behaviour. In contrast, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards -- closely associated with the origins of Hezbollah and still Hezbollah's key to arms and financial and other support -- has no interest in or skills associated with the use of soft power in any context. It is accustomed to using its hard power. Its methods in Lebanon, and perhaps in due course in Syria, are corrupted by it. And it now risks pushing Hezbollah, Syria and Assad even further towards the wrong side of Arab history.
