Recent reports indicate that some Iraqi Sunni militants have called on cohorts to join the jihad in Syria. The death of a Saudi who took part in a protest was well publicized. It won't be difficult for Al Qaeda or other militant groups to exploit the perception among many that the devastation befalling Sunni Muslims is being perpetrated mostly by Alawites, Druze and Christians.
One must remember that hundreds of Arab men left everything behind and traveled to Afghanistan to fight a conflict billed as the ultimate jihad in the 1980s. Likewise in Iraq, Arabs from Sunni-majority nations went to fight the Americans and their Shia Safavid allies who were also portrayed as conspiring against Sunnis. In both these conflicts, however, foreign militants were motivated by narratives that were not corroborated nearly to the same extent as Syria's will continue to be. Hours of amateur footage documenting Al Shabiha's brutality could make Al Qaeda's pitch an easy sell.
Al Qaeda gained traction by pointing to the Russians in Afghanistan as a faceless symbol of godless communism. Even in Iraq, no single Shia figure was widely reviled - although of late Nouri al Maliki has become a polarizing figure.
Assad, though, is a target of Arab ire, with scores of participants on internet forums daily wishing him a "Gaddafi ending." Detractors rarely refer to him by either his first or last name, and many simply call him "Al Taghiya," the Tyrant.
Formation of an international consensus on proceeding in Syria has proven elusive. While Western nations, including the US , France and Britain, seem to be losing patience with Assad's continuing brutality and intransigence, others, especially Russia and China, also permanent members of the UN Security Council, have expressed strong reservations about any UN-sanctioned international intervention, including economic sanctions or military action.
Although the Arab League has taken unprecedented initiatives against Assad's regime - suspending Syria's membership from the regional body and imposing economic sanctions which could potentially adversely affect the Syrian economy, especially over the long-term - the abstention of Iraq and Lebanon from the vote on the sanctions has highlighted the lack of a unified approach among Arab nations as well.
Nevertheless, if the carnage continues - and most indicators suggest it will - reluctant countries may have to come to terms with two realities:
The first is that Assad's brutal crackdown has made it virtually impossible for his regime to ever be considered a respectable member of the international community. Any future dealings with him will come at great political cost.
Second, Assad's survival, especially when juxtaposed with Mubarak's or Ben Ali's ousters - both of whom offered much more tepid reactions to their own protestors - will strike many around the Arab world as patently unjust, particularly among Syrians themselves.
Al Qaeda and other militant groups will spare no effort to harness this sense of injustice to the fullest.
If the international community does not take a firm stand now, it could find itself having to choose between supporting a brutal regime that has killed thousands of its own people or allowing Al Qaeda to turn Syria into a staging ground where it could recover from massive losses suffered in recent years but also potentially create a new generation of militants. At the very least, Syria could reinforce Al Qaeda's narrative - which maintains that Muslims the world over are under siege - giving it a much needed boost, at a time when the terrorist group is desperate to regain its footing.
