2012 commenced with an escalation of rhetoric between the United States and Iran. More than ever, the drumbeat for a military strike on Iran was heard, aimed at disrupting its military nuclear program. Iran responded by warning of the consequences of any such attack.
Top U.S. officials made their resolve clear, suggesting that a military strike was a viable option for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. President Barack Obama underscored that it would be unacceptable for Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, pledging to 'keep up the pressure' and taking no option 'off the table.' Defense Secretary Leon Panetta alluded to a tight timetable, presenting 2012 as the critical year in which Iran could develop nuclear weapons. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey cautioned against an Iranian miscalculation 'that would be a tragedy for the region and the world.'
Meanwhile, mysterious explosions and assassinations of nuclear scientists and an escalating cyber-war have led to speculation that various states are contesting Iran's program in the shadows. This was accompanied by reports of U.S. arm sales to Iran's Arab neighbors.
Iran's harsh response went so far as to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz — the key strategic waterway that serves as a conduit for some one-third of the world's oil. Iran's navy chief, Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, voiced the threat publicly and First Vice-President Mohammad Reza Rahimi reiterated that further Western economic sanctions would come at a steep cost: Not a drop of oil would pass through Hormuz. In December, Iran launched a 10-day naval exercise to demonstrate that it could back its threats with action, then warned the U.S. not to return an aircraft carrier 'to the Persian Gulf region,' adding bluntly: 'We don't have the habit of repeating threats twice.'
What fueled the escalation? First, recognition that the possession of nuclear arms by a regime with such a radical ideology would dramatically change the geostrategic map of the Middle East and trigger regional nuclear proliferation. Nuclear Iran would also serve as an umbrella for Islamist movements, like Hamas and Hezbollah, leading to their greater radicalization.
The 'Arab Spring,' Iran's reactive policy in the region (mainly in Bahrain and Syria), and its policies elsewhere (mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan) have rendered the Iranian challenge even more alarming. Moreover, while Iran's national interest until recently balanced its radical ideology, producing relative pragmatism, now Tehran seems to be primarily concerned with regime survival.
Imagine what could have happened if Libya's Moammar al-Gadhafi had nuclear weapons a few months ago, or Bashar Assad of Syria these days. The International Atomic Energy Agency's November report suggesting that Iran had a clandestine nuclear military program was thus another impetus for concern and escalation.
Then too, recognition that pressure works to weaken Iran stimulated calls for greater pressure. The approaching U.S. presidential elections, with Republican candidates censuring the administration for its mild policy, also caused the latter to issue harsher statements. Finally, U.S. Middle East allies — mainly Saudi Arabia and Israel — have persistently pressured Washington to confront Iran. Thus Washington's rhetoric may have also been designed to calm its allies and dissuade them (mainly Israel) from taking independent steps that could drag the U.S. into open confrontation with Iran.
There is also recognition that Iran is weak and vulnerable and can still be pressured to reconsider its policy. Neither the attack on the British Embassy in Tehran nor the threats to close the Strait of Hormuz (which was not closed during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war) signal strength. Pressures from within are rising on the Iranian regime: not only growing popular disenchantment, but also signs of cracks within the ruling elite, including divisions between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
