Finally there is a group of ex-Putin-regime officials who are calling for both political and economic reforms, of whom Alexei Kudrin is one of the most prominent. He was sackedas finance minister in September after openly disagreeing with the Putin-Medvedev role swap and questioning the wisdom behind increased public and military spending on the eve of a possible new economic crisis. Kudrin, who joined protesters on 24 December, has called for reform of electoral laws and offered his services as a mediator between protesters and the authorities, including Putin himself. The offer has so far been rejected by both sides.
The established parliamentary parties - the Communist Party, ‘A Just Russia' and the Liberal Democratic Party - have not endorsed the rallies. The Communist Party held its own protests. Even the Orthodox Church, having called on the authorities to listen to the voice of the people, distanced itself from the mass protests.
Presidential elections and beyond
Russia is now bracing itself for presidential elections set to take place on 4 March. Five candidates have registered with the Central Electoral Commission, four of whom will be representing parliamentary parties: Putin (United Russia); Gennady Zyuganov (Communist Party); Sergei Mironov (A Just Russia); and Zhirinovsky (Liberal Democratic Party). Billionaire businessman turned politician Mikhail Prokhorov is the only independent candidate to have successfully met the Electoral Commission's requirement for 2m signatures to be submitted in support of a candidacy. Veteran liberal politician Grigory Yavlinsky (Yabloko) and Irkutsk governor Dmitry Mezentsev were both disqualified after over 5% of the signatures they submitted were rejected. Popular opposition figures, such as Navalny, have not registered.
With a month to go, Putin's support appears too weak for him to win in the first round. The Levada Center, an independent polling organisation, puts Putin's rating at 37%, while Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, and Prokhorov trail him on 8%, 5% and 4% respectively. Some 22% of respondents are still undecided.
While the wave of protests symbolises a political awakening in Russia, it seems unlikely to bring about true democratic change in the foreseeable future. Putin is expected to weather the storm and win the elections. However, his forthcoming six-year presidency could be much different from his first two terms, with political instability spreading, the legitimacy and effectiveness of his model ofgovernance being eroded and Russia's relative economic and geopolitical strength declining. In these circumstances, Putin's prospects of winning a fourth term look poor. Any attempt to suppress the protests could accelerate his demise.
The US government's refusal to issue an unqualified apology for the incident further inflamed Pakistani opinion, and a subsequent Pentagon report which concluded that both sides shared some responsibility for the incident was roundly rejected by Pakistan. The government of President Asif Ali Zardari stated that Pakistan was reviewing all aspects of its security relationship with the US and would seek to base future cooperation on written undertakings. In the new relationship, Pakistan would aim to limit the number and scope of drone attacks, reduce the US intelligence and military presence, and demand a significant increase in payments for resuming the supply of materiel into Afghanistan.
Government friction
Meanwhile longstanding tensions between Zardari's civilian government and Pakistan's military leadership came to the surface through the so-called 'Memogate' affair which led to the recall of Pakistan's ambassador to Washington, Hussain Haqqani, who now faces a possible charge of high treason.
The origin of Memogate - seen by many as an ISI information operation designed to undermine Zardari - was an article in the 10 October 2011 edition of the Financial Times by US-Pakistani businessman Mansoor Ijaz. He claimed to have been asked by Haqqani to deliver to senior US officials a message from Zardari seeking US assistance to prevent a possible coup d'état by the army, supposedly because it was anxious to prevent an independent inquiry into the circumstances which led to bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad. In return for this assistance, Zardari apparently offered to dismiss the current generation of military leaders, close down ISI's S Wing - the cadre of 'retired' officers responsible for retaining links with extremist groups - and give the US a free hand to conduct counterterrorism operations inside Pakistan. The memorandum was reportedly delivered to Admiral Mullen, who subsequently confirmed that he had received it but said he had not regarded it as credible.
The degree of tension generated by Memogate was evident when Zardari sought refuge in Dubai on 6 December, supposedly to seek medical treatment for a heart condition. (He returned on 18 December.) Later, a sharp exchange between Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani reflected the continued civil-military tension. In a speech to mark the birth of Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Gilani said: 'There can be no state within a state ... People will have to decide whether they want elected people or a dictatorship in the country.' Kayani responded that the army 'is fully cognizant of its constitutional obligations and responsibilities'.
There is in fact little evidence to suggest that Kayani and his subordinates have any appetite for a military takeover which would replicate all the problems of the previous administration of General Pervez Musharraf. Though they are undoubtedly keen to see the back of Zardari, they appear to see their best hope of achieving this through an election, possibly in 2012, in which former cricketer Imran Khan, whose political profile seems to be gathering popular momentum after years of failing to gain traction, might form a new civilian administration which would take account of military interests.
Diverging interests
At the root of US-Pakistani tensions is the question of Afghanistan's future after 2014, when US and other Western combat operations in Afghanistan are scheduled to end - a timetable dictated by domestic political and budgetary factors. For Pakistan's military this timetable is a vindication of its long-held conviction that sooner or later the US and its allies would abandon Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan to confront a situation inimical to its strategic interests. It would either leave India in a strategically dominant position or result in a lapse back into the chaos that had prevailed between the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992 and the assumption of power by the Taliban in 1996, which would have a major destabilising effect on Pakistan. With 2014 looming, the interests of Washington and Islamabad are different.
From the US perspective, the priority is to leave behind as stable a situation as possible. To this end, NATO-led forces are training Afghanistan's security forces - army and police - so that they can take responsibility for security. This has progressed to the point where the security of an increasing number of cities and districts is now formally under Afghan control.
At the same time, the US is trying to hold negotiations with the Quetta Shura to seek a political outcome to the insurgency and thus reduce future challenges to the still-developing Afghan security forces.
In November 2011 the White House acknowledged that the US government had been in negotiations with representatives of the Quetta Shura led by Tayyib Agha, an aide to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. In six meetings tentative agreement had been reached on the transfer of five Afghan prisoners from Guantanamo Bay to house arrest in Qatar and for the Taliban publicly to renounce links with international terrorism. Karzai balked at these arrangements, probably under pressure from political allies from the Northern Alliance who oppose any negotiation with the Taliban. The Afghan government also objected to a proposal that the Taliban establish an office in Qatar to facilitate further negotiations, though it later withdrew its objection provided that no foreign power engaged in dealings with the Taliban without its consent, and that no negotiations took place until the Taliban ceased violence against civilian targets, cut ties to al-Qaeda and accepted the existing Afghan constitution.
Although views differ on the extent to which the Taliban leadership is serious about entering into negotiations, some experts believe it is ready to do so but its hands are tied by a Pakistani military reluctant to see talks progress - though it is unlikely that the talks referred to above could have happened if Pakistan had not at least tacitly acquiesced.
From Pakistan's perspective, the military does not believe that there will be an end to hostilities by 2014 - nor in any case would it favour the emergence of a stable Afghanistan if this were seen as privileging the interests of India and rendering Pakistan vulnerable to strategic encirclement. On the assumption of continued hostilities, Pakistan's military will want to ensure that extremist groups - which it regards as strategic assets in confronting an uncertain security situation in Afghanistan after 2014 - are protected from the process of attrition that the US has inflicted on al-Qaeda.
With the clock ticking, recent tensions between the US and Pakistan can be seen as the drawing of lines in the sand - a process of defining the limits to which Pakistani and US interests do and do not intersect in relation to Afghanistan. Both sides have many reasons to avoid a complete rupture in relations. For the US, Pakistan is a key factor in the struggle against extremist terrorism and nuclear proliferation. For Pakistan, the US remains both an important source of international legitimation and funding, as well as being the only major power able to exercise strategic leverage on India in the event that Indo-Pakistani relations undergo another major deterioration.
There are signs that, having looked into the abyss, the two countries are working to ensure that essential collaboration continues. But a further serious incident could prove terminal for a relationship that neither party has ever found satisfactory.
