Israel has been further unbalanced by the Arab Awakening, especially the loss of the Mubarak regime with which it had worked effectively and the electoral success of the Muslim Brother and the Salafist party Al-Nour. The attack by protesters on its Embassy in Cairo last September was deeply shocking for Israelis. 6 embassy staff had to be rescued by Egyptian commandos. The recent success of Hamas in Gaza in linking more effectively with communities across North Africa has been an added worry. Even the threat to the Assad regime in Syria is a cause of concern. While that regime has been a supporter of the Hezbollah movement, it has also been stable and has not pushed too hard on the issue of the control of the Golan Heights.
Beyond these issues, though, the most serious long-term threat to the state of Israel is seen as Iran, especially its nuclear weapons potential. Israel takes a harsh view of Iranian intentions, a view exacerbated by Holocaust-denial rhetoric from Mr Ahmadinejad. Furthermore, Israeli sources believe that Iran is determined to develop nuclear weapons and is far closer to doing so than western analysts and intelligence agencies believe. The Israeli political leadership does not believe that sanctions against Iran will work. At the same time, the leadership faces a problem in that it has argued for many years that Iran is no more than one or two years away from having a nuclear weapons capability, leading to a “crying wolf” view of Israeli attitudes.
Even so, three factors remain which are relevant. One is that Iran is undoubtedly enhancing its ability to enrich Uranium, and the second is that its newer facilities are being developed underground, with very high levels of protection. As a result, there is a common Israeli view that a window of opportunity for military action is closing and that within a year, it will be well-nigh impossible to do serious damage to Iranian nuclear potential by military action. Defence Minister Ehud Barak has warned of Iran entering a “zone of immunity.”
The third factor is that the Israeli Defence Forces have worked determinedly in recent years to develop a capability to take action at long range. Any attack on Iranian nuclear facilities prior to 2005 would have been extremely limited, but recent changes include the deployment of over 120 F-15I and F-16I strike aircraft together with earth-penetrating bombs, improved aerial-refuelling, development of long-range armed drones and the seeking of forward operating bases in countries close to Iran. Because of this, there is a belief within the IDF that serious damage could be done to Iran’s nuclear potential. It is recognised that such action could well incite a Hezbollah response, but that this might provide an opportunity to severely damage the organisation in a manner that Israel singularly failed to do in 2006.
In spite of the sense of gathering crisis, it should be emphasised that some significant actors within Israel are opposed to military action against Iran, with this including former senior intelligence officials and retired armed forces officers. They point partly to the logistic problems but more to the consequences of military action. The key point here is that an attack on Iran will unify that country and make it determined to develop a nuclear deterrent force, occasioning the need for further attacks in the years to come. These views resonate with some sectors of Israeli society but it must be said that since the start of 2012 there has been a notable increase in the Israeli media in the rhetoric concerning the need to act against Iran.
United States
U.S.-Iranian relations worsened hugely at the end of the 1970s. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979-80, the Shah had been a key regional ally of the United States in the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. That changed radically when the Shah was deposed in 1979, a situation made far worse by the hostage crisis of 1979-81 when 52 U.S. diplomats were detained for 444 days. This experience had a long-term negative impact on the U.S. diplomatic and foreign policy community. Moreover, revolutionary Iran became widely regarded as the most substantial problem for U.S. security interests in the Middle East, a problem exacerbated by the attitude towards Iran of its closest ally – Israel.
