This mutually antagonistic relationship persisted through to the 2000s, with the George W Bush administration seeing Iran as part of an “axis of evil”, supporting terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction and therefore deserving of regime termination. Among supporters of the Bush administration, many saw the “War on Terror” as a means of limiting Tehran’s power by terminating the Afghan and Iraqi regimes, and thereby constraining Iran’s regional influence. In 2006 there was a particular period of crisis when it looked possible that U.S. forces would act against Iran, but the election of Barack Obama in November 2008 resulted in some easing of tensions.
By 2010, President Obama had determined on a large-scale military withdrawal from Iraq, which was largely completed by late last year, and by early 2012, it was clear that his administration had accepted the need for a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, whatever progress had been made in negotiating with the Taliban and other armed opposition groups. Both the Iraqi withdrawal and the partial Afghan drawdown have majority public support in the United States, even though Obama’s political opponents argue strongly that this is allowing Iran much greater regional influence, especially in Iraq.
The Obama administration’s attitude to a possible Israeli strike on Iran is complicated. At the military level there is a real fear that it would be counterproductive. Substantial U.S. forces may have been moved into the region, including a potential naval presence of three carrier battle groups and reinforcing of troop levels in Oman and elsewhere, but these appear primarily to be available at a time of crisis started by others, rather than in any way precipitating a war.
The race for the Republican nomination is proving long and hard, and whichever candidate wins will have a problem in attacking Obama in the Republicans’ chosen arena – the economy – in the light of recent improvements which have given Obama a polling boost. It is therefore likely that the Republicans will focus particularly on foreign policy, with some emphasis on the need to face down Iran. In spite of support for Obama’s policies on Iraq and Afghanistan, there is currently a majority in favour of action against Iran. The Republicans will be helped in this by domestic support for Israel, which stems partly from the American Jewish community but also from the much larger number of Christian Zionists - several tens of millions of them - who regard the preservation of Israel as central to God’s plan for the “End Days” of humankind.
There are two further electoral considerations. If Barack Obama is re-elected in November, he will have a 2-year period in which he can make considerable demands on Israel in its approach to peace with the Palestinians. He may also be forcefully opposed to Israeli action against Iran. Meanwhile, Israel faces an election in September, and there is an argument that a pre-election war with Iran would strengthen the current leadership.
Conclusion
While there is much uncertainty, given the complexities of the political context in all three countries, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a particular risk of some kind of military confrontation in the six months to September. This is in spite of the many voices in the United States, Western Europe, and even Israel, that are calling for restraint. It is certainly likely to be a time of considerable tension, and in such circumstances the so-called “AIM” factor becomes important – Accidents, Incidents and Mavericks. Any one of these factors might exacerbate a crisis, and this means that it is particularly important to work for an easing of the tensions. If that happens and a conflict is avoided in the coming months, then there is a good chance that negotiations in a calmer atmosphere next year might meet with success.
