Europe and Asia
Some Russian commentators argue that a key element of Medvedev's legacy is the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy towards Asia. This may not have been his original plan, but the global financial crisis and the rise of China have made it imperative for Moscow to look east for new opportunities, even as it perceives new challenges and threats. Medvedev paid numerous visits to China and Southeast Asia, and became the first Russian leader to visit the Kuril Islands, which are the subject of a territorial dispute with Japan.
Yet among Medvedev's 129 foreign trips as president, the Euro-Atlantic region dominated the list of destinations. Despite his many visits, Medvedev cannot claim to have achieved any significant improvement in EU-Russian relations, not least because of Europe's preoccupation with its own economic crisis. His EU-Russia 'partnership for modernisation', in common with his agenda for domestic reform, was heavy on rhetoric but lacking in substance.
For his part, Putin seems likely to shift his foreign-policy priorities away from Europe and the US, where his return to the presidency received a lukewarm welcome. The first visit he paid after announcing his comeback as president was to China, while on 10 May he announced that he would not attend the 18-19 May G8 summit hosted by Obama at Camp David because he would be too busy finalising his cabinet, and would send Medvedev in his place.
Global and regional governance
Medvedev revitalised Russia's participation in the G8 and other international groupings. He paid considerable attention to Russia's role in the informal set of emerging nations known as the 'BRICS' (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), pushing for the BRICS to become a more political grouping with regular summits and attempts to coordinate policies.
Though Russia's support for sanctions on Iran and its abstention from the Libya resolution improved its image abroad, at home these moves were poorly received - many Russians resented NATO's intervention in Libya's civil war that toppled Muammar Gadhafi from power. Indeed, Russian leaders felt that NATO far exceeded the mandate of the UN resolution by engineering Gadhafi's removal. Moscow would, therefore, be unlikely to allow a repeat of the Libya scenario in Syria (though the West as yet shows no appetite for such an intervention). Russia and China both vetoed UN resolutions calling for an end to the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. For Moscow, it was important not to back a UN resolution that would give Western powers legal cover to remove Assad, or that would place preconditions - such as Assad's departure - on negotiations within Syria. However, Russia's veto undermined its reputation not only on the Arab street, but also among some of its traditional friends in the Arab League, as well as Turkey.
Despite Medvedev's rhetoric and limited attempts at democratic reform, it was remarkable that the 2011 Arab Awakening passed the Russian political establishment by. Convinced that Arab uprisings were orchestrated by external actors - in line with Russian perceptions of the 'colour revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine - they failed to foresee that Putin's comeback for a third presidential term would encourage protests among Russia's own middle class.
Countries in Russia's traditional sphere of influence have long formed a key part of Putin's agenda, and this focus seems set to be renewed. Some steps were taken during Medvedev's term: a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan was established, and institutions were set up to promote the Eurasian Common Economic Space. But Putin signalled more ambitious intent with a decree signed on the day of his inauguration, declaring the integration of post-Soviet Eurasia to be a foreign-policy priority. Eurasian leaders - particularly those in Ukraine who would be reluctant to be drawn back into Russia's orbit - will be watching anxiously to see what this might mean in practice.
Staying the course
Though Medvedev achieved key foreign-policy successes, such as the New START and Russia's WTO accession agreement, and had a positive image abroad, it cannot be said that he altered the course of Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy. He made little real progress in dismantling Cold War legacies in Russia's relations with the West, and particularly its attitudes towards the US and NATO. Putin capitalised on anti-American sentiment to boost his popularity during his presidential election campaign. Under Putin, building new relationships will be difficult, given the long-standing narrative, fuelled by Putin himself, depicting NATO as a conspiracy that seeks to exploit, undermine and encircle Russia.
Under Medvedev, Russian foreign policy remained reactive: his only original initiative - the proposed Euro-Atlantic security treaty - was poorly executed and will leave no lasting legacy. Though he began the process of re-orienting Russia's policy towards Asia, progress was limited. Moscow will see the forthcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vladivostok as an opportunity to enhance its influence, and it is expected to increase oil exports to Asia.
In addition, the constraints on Russia's ambitions in the post-Soviet space became more evident under Medvedev. Many of the region's authoritarian leaders resented Medvedev's declared agenda of reform and questioned why, unlike many of them, Putin had not changed the constitution so as to lift all limits on how long he could stay in office, as well as the parameters of his influence.
Putin's return to the presidency will raise questions as to how Russia's foreign policy will evolve with a leader whose support base is somewhat diminished. Compared with his previous two terms, Putin faces higher expectations among the population, but lower economic growth - in addition to more vocal opposition among the urban middle class. Unlike Medvedev, Putin carries full responsibility for the country's future trajectory in both domestic and foreign affairs. Russia's foreign relations, which were already becoming more prickly, are unlikely to be any less so.
