Another scenario is that the Beduin take control of the country. This is a possibility today as the anti-regime/proreform protests have been driven by them, and they make up the regime's army and security agencies, which protect the king.
The Beduin have a history of tribal unrest and in-fighting, and furthermore they have been heavily radicalized. For example terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian Beduin. Such a situation would create havoc and tribal unrest in Jordan, and the Beduin are likely to be hostile to both the Palestinians in Jordan and to Israel.
THERE IS, though, a more positive opposition to the king. There are moderate opposition movements in Jordan, mostly dominated by Palestinians as well as moderate "native" Jordanians, that are quite active in the peaceful protests and political arena.
In fact, the major Jordanian opposition movement, the March 24 movement, and the Tafilah Movement (in the south) are at disagreement with the Muslim Brotherhood.
However, the secular movements in Jordan lack funding and receive little media coverage, as major Arab media such as Al Jazeera seem to focus only on the Islamist opposition. Therefore, they are less likely to dominate any future democratic elections in Jordan if the king falls.
So what is to be done? Should the world simply sit back and wait to see if a situation identical to Egypt or Tunisia unfolds in Jordan? Firstly, it would be very wise of Israel not to meddle in the current Jordanian affair, as it might end up being blamed by Arabs, Jordanian and Palestinians alike over whatever the outcome might be.
Israel should consider a careful "just in case" Plan B for Jordan that will secure the arrival of non-hostile forces to rule Jordan in case the king falls. Such a Plan B must be thought of like an extra gas tank - you only use when you run out of gas.
Israel and pro-Israel forces across the world must think up ways to mitigate the damage should the Hashemite regime fall, and possibly find workable back-up plans to support the secular Palestinians' and moderate Jordanians' bid for power.
Such a plan should be carefully examined and prepared, then quietly executed if a need for it arises, and never before that.
