The geostrategic considerations gathered momentum in the past two years due to several developments, all of which impacted negatively on Turkey's environment and its foreign policy configurations.
Before analyzing these changes it must be stressed that the stance of the AKP government toward the Kurdish domestic issue as well as towards the KRG underwent slow transformation, which distinguished the AKP from earlier Kemalist governments.
The geostrategic changes were quite drastic, including the 'Arab Spring,' which accelerated the collapse of the Turkish-Iranian-Syrian axis. Furthermore, the revolution in Syria not only turned Ankara and Damascus into sworn enemies once again but also raised the specter of the influx of Syrian refugees. Worse still, it opened the Pandora's box of Syrian Kurds and their possible collaboration with their brethren in Turkey, not to speak of the PKK card which Damascus started to employ once again against Ankara.
The withdrawal of the American forces from Iraq in November 2011 and the vacuum left thereby was another very worrying development for Turkey, as it enhanced its competition with Iran for filling this vacuum.
Lastly, one should note the deteriorating relations between Ankara and Baghdad against the background of the Sunni-Shi'ite rivalry in the region, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's growing tilt toward Iran and his support for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, as well as the growing personal antipathy between Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Maliki.
All this weakened Ankara's 'commitment' to the almost sacred notion of Iraqi unity and emboldened it in its bilateral ties with the KRG, the most challenging of which for Baghdad was the oil pipeline deal mentioned above.
Turkey's changing policy towards the KRG and its president Masu'd Barzani found its expression on the symbolic level as well.
Barzani's April visit to Turkey was a case in point. While in the past Ankara treated Barzani as a mere 'head of tribe,' in this most recent visit it accorded him a welcome befitting a head of state, thus turning him into one of its important allies in the region. Moreover, in this visit Barzani reiterated publicly the Kurds' right to self-determination but, interestingly enough, Turkish officials and the media chose to turn 'a deaf ear' to this declaration.
Turkey is facing now a Kurdish problem on all three fronts, which has multiplied its dilemmas but which has moved it, so it seems, to adopt a flexible and non-conventional policy: Embracing the KRG so as to contain its own Kurds and Syria's as well. Should Turkey decide to give Barzani the green light, he would not hesitate to go the extra mile and declare independence. One thing is certain: Turkey has willy-nilly helped the Kurdish genie escape from the bottle and it will be very difficult for Ankara to push it back inside.
