Many (wrongly) thought the Houla massacre would tip the balance in favor of those arguing for an intervention on humanitarian grounds. The Assad regime's natural response, echoed by the Russians, was to muddy the waters regarding what actually happened. The objective was to embarrass, throw off balance, and neutralize the humanitarian interventionists on their own turf, which is moral, not strategic. "There are no good guys," is the message of Assad's info op.
One could argue that in the case of the Houla massacre, the propaganda effort had limited success, as no major news outlet outside of NRO ran with the FAZ story. However, the information operation has another function, and this one appears to be more successful.
Since the outbreak of the uprising, the Assad regime has claimed that it was really combatting armed Islamist groups. By projecting the message that there is nothing and no one worth supporting in the opposition to his regime ("no good guys"), Assad's propaganda aims to buttress the idea that his opponents are, if not all fanatical Sunni extremists, then certainly deeply penetrated and even dominated by them.
Beyond the moral realm, the "there are no good guys" message aims to influence strategic priorities. More specifically, it seeks to heighten strategic confusion about the primary US objective in Syria - toppling the Assad regime - and thus reinforce the Obama administration's indecision and reluctance to lead.
Hence, we've heard senior officials in the Obama administration, from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to UN Ambassador Susan Rice, say that arming the opposition could be tantamount to arming al-Qaeda, since we don't know who this opposition really is.
This line has made successful inroads on the Right as well, as a quick perusal of recent articles shows. It helps explain why Rosenthal quickly embraced the FAZ report without critical evaluation. What it also reveals is a confused prioritization of US interests in the region. Paralyzed by the conviction that Assad's opponents are little more than jihadists, proponents of this view lose sight of the fact that the Assad regime gave jihadists the run of the place for years, turning Syria into their hub as long as they focused their energies on Iraq and Lebanon.
More importantly, this position misses the key strategic objective for the US in region. In addition to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, the primary goal for the US is to undermine Tehran's ability to project power in the region by destroying its network of alliances. This begins with the removal of the Assad regime from power.
Sound policy emanates from clear strategic vision. Given that its survival is at stake, it is no surprise that the Assad regime has made maximum use of information warfare to cloud its adversaries' strategic vision, planting second thoughts in their minds about the strategic goal of undermining the regime. What is surprising about this campaign is the way in which many on the US side have been so susceptible to it.
