Drones also present a significant advantage both in terms of costs and in terms of personnel for ISR purposes. It is important to remember that a Predator costs $4.5 million and presents little to no risk to personnel while a F-22 Raptor fighter jet approaches $150 million and requires an ample amount of technical experience. The lowered costs of drones, which has seen an increase in Pentagon spending on them, indicate that they remain both the weapon and ISR tool of choice for the Obama administration.
When Drones Go Wrong
A lot of the criticism of the drone policy centers around winning the battle for hearts and minds on the ground. Drones have been responsible for significant collateral damage both in Yemen and AfPak, with cumulatively over 300 confirmed civilian casualties from botched strikes. Especially in Yemen, the civilians have a string endearment to AQAP and Ansar-al-Shariah, which is reflected in the significant growth in AQAP membership to over 700 members. Drones are dangerous because they polarize opinion on Al Hadi's government. Because of the role Ansar al-Sharia has played in soothing the humanitarian crisis in South of Yemen, civilians respect them as administrators of the area, transforming AQAP to a people's organization in the process. Therefore, AQAP casualties help fuel vitriolic anti-America rhetoric. Mohammed al-Ahmadi, legal coordinator for Karama, a local human rights group suggests that, "The drones are killing al-Qaeda leaders, but they are also turning them into heroes." In 2012 alone, the U.S. has killed 132 militants in Yemen, a staggering 50 more than the number killed in 2011, and more than quadruple the number of militants assassinated between 2008 and 2010; this ramped-up targeted killing program foments hostility towards the U.S. and Al Hadi's government.
The drone policy has also severely displaced many Yemenis within the country. Former U.S. Ambassador Barbara Bodine believes that the impact of drones is vastly underrated, going as far as to suggest that the indiscriminate reliance on drones in Yemen is stumbling block to support from Yemeni civilians. Exacerbating the rage caused by the targeted killings themselves is the climate of fear that pervades the use of; drones are known for distinctive, clearly audible buzzing sound much akin to that the buzzing of a bee. Therefore, drone use, even for ISR purposes, can be remarkably disruptive with Yemeni civilians on the ground viewing drones as an attack on their sovereignty and their ability live peacefully within their country. Groups like AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia feed into the insecurity of Yemeni civilians and tribesmen, exploiting the presence of drones to galvanize their anti-American rhetoric, and weaken support for al-Hadi's presidency.
The American mission in Yemen lies in restoring legitimacy to Abd al-Hadi's central government. In country facing rising food insecurity, severe malnutrition and a lack of sanitation, the long term project must address this humanitarian crisis. A U.S. policy which drives itself purely based on American domestic interests is therefore consigned for failure in the region. It is imperative that Yemen does not go the way of Afghanistan where the Karzai's Central Government pales in legitimacy when compared to the Taliban. The challenge in Yemen is a political one and especially in light of "signature strikes," it's necessary to re-evaluate whether we ultimately think that launching Predator drones that fire cruise missiles is the solution to this problem.
Comparing Pakistan and Yemen
Despite the different security dynamics in Yemen and Pakistan, the drone policy in each region has fed the other. One notable overlap between drone operations in both countries is the doctrine of signature strikes, a remnant from the days of the Bush administration, which supported targeting a group of individuals that were engaging in "suspicious activity." One commonality between the drone attacks in Pakistan, and Yemen is a re-hauling of the approval process. Under former CIA director Michael Hayden, the approval for drone strikes could be delegated down from the Director and his deputy. Following a failed signature strike in Karez Kot, Pakistan, where a prominent village elder was killed, Obama introduced large procedural changes to the policy, most notably banning the CIA director from delegating the decision to carry out a drone strike down the chain. A key structural change implemented in Pakistan, and now used in Yemen, is the Presidential approval required for ordering a drone strike. Obama, it turns out, keeps a "Kill List," with the names of both alleged and confirmed Al Qaeda and AQAP militants on it. Key members of Obama's advisory council on his drone policy include chief counter-terrorism advisor John Brennan, Legal Adviser of the Department of State Harold Koh and General Counsel of the Department of Defense Jeh Johnson. This "drone council" has played an active role in AfPak, and now in Yemen, in determining who to target. A key facet of this council is the diversity in terms of political beliefs and backgrounds of its members. The overwhelming support for the policy that comes from the CIA is balanced by the pragmatic centrism of Jeh Johnson and the liberal views of Harold Koh, who was a noted critic of targeted killings. These added levels of accountability are a departure from the days of the drone policy under Admiral Mike Mullen.
The use of drones in Yemen has also accounted for and remedied mistakes made in the AfPak region. For instance, deaths caused by friendly fire have significantly reduced, and even been entirely eliminated in some areas. In the aftermath of an accident involving Marines in April 2011, the Pentagon addressed the poor communications, faulty assumptions and "a lack of overall common situational awareness" that led to the accident. This couples with recommended detailed reviews of battlefield procedures has had the desired effect of lowering casualties, with no reports of friendly fire incidents in Yemen. The U.S. is also improving the technical capabilities of drones after the experiences in AfPak, with reports alleging research into nuclear powered drones. Such drones would resolve persistent issues including insufficient hang time over targets, lack of power for sophisticated surveillance and lack of communications capacity.
Conclusion
While drone usage remains controversial, many discussions of the issue and fail to recognize the requisite middle ground in the doctrine. Given recent developments in Yemen where AQAP continues to fortify itself by winning hearts and minds, building alliances with foreign militants and recruiting new members and franchises (such as Ansar al Shariah) to join its cause, it is necessary to ask ourselves the following question - would we rather keep Al Qaeda and its franchises on the move, forcing them to disperse their locations, or are we willing to take the risk of them operating from an established hub in order to cut their fiery rhetoric?
Drone strikes give the U.S. the unique ability to target and eliminate key AQAP cell leaders without having to put boots on the ground. When combined with the ISR capabilities of drones, the the United Sates. The Yemeni goverment has the comfort of knowing that the entire process of fighting terrorism in the area has essentially been outsourced to it. Preventing AQAP from building a permanent base in Yemen is necessary to allow foreign personnel and Yemeni authorities to act to stem the humanitarian crisis. Threatening AQAP will hopefully help reduce the flow of militants and arms from proximate regions into the Abyan insurgency, and would also weaken the Al Qaeda-Al Shabaab nexus. Drones certainly aren't ideal; but given the nature of the enemy in question, they may just be the best bet.
