The B-2 strategic stealth bomber would be a key component, given its ability either to drop more than forty bombs in a single sortie or to deliver very large earth-penetrating bombs. But its dependence on extensive base-support facilities means that the B-2 can operate only from a handful or air-bases worldwide; the most relevant candidates are RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, western England, and Diego Garcia, a British-controlled atoll in the Indian Ocean. Britain would thus be directly involved in the war from the start.
In addition to the B-2s and F-22s, other planes - F-15E and F-16 strike aircraft - would be deployed to launch joint air-to-surface stand-off missiles (JASSMS) from outside Iranian airspace. A key system here is the AGM-158 Jassm-ER, a new version of which has a range of 575 miles (more than double the current 230-mile version) and is being deployed in 2013.
The Usaf planes would be central to the assault on Iran, but the US navy would also attack with sea-launched cruise-missiles (launched from cruisers, destroyers and submarines) and stand-off air-launched missiles (launched from F/A-18s flying from the carriers).
A state of mind
All these systems (and there are many others) amount to far more than Israel can deploy. But the distinctive aspect of the plan is less its scale or the perceived need to take charge from Israel than the idea that underpins it, at least among some of the planners: namely, that a focused, single-minded attack aimed specifically at Iran's nuclear and missile facilities will intimidate Iran into an acceptance that its nuclear ambition is a lost cause.
The respected defence journal Aviation Week quotes one strategic veteran: "We should give Iran advanced warning that we will damage and likely destroy its nuclear facilities. It is not an act of war against Iran, the Iranian people or Islam. It is a pre-emptive attack solely against their nuclear facilities and the military targets protecting them. We will take extraordinary measures against collateral damage."
It should be emphasised that an American attack is neither imminent nor even likely (at least for now). But if negotiations with Iran fail, if Mitt Romney wins the presidential election and the Republicans control at least one house of Congress, then things could begin to look very different in the early months of 2013.
Perhaps the most significant element of this scenario is that if it came to a war, the Iranians would readily give up in the face of such great force. The assumption is extraordinary, yet the underlying mentality is familiar: it also produced the belief that the Taliban was finished by the end of 2001 and the Iraq war was over in three weeks flat in March-April 2003. It seems that nothing has been learned from the experience of two long and bloody wars, and that is the real cause for worry.
