Unemployment rates were and remain high, and inequality was palpable. Egyptians consistently list economic concerns in DEDI-ACPSS surveys. Similarly, Arab Barometer polls have found that Arabs' support for democracy is often founded on economic considerations more than political liberties. Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler in Journal of Democracy, January 2008, argue that 'economic issues are central to the way that many Arab citizens think about governance.
Yet, issues of dignity and identity also spurred the uprisings. Nearly half of Egyptian respondents claiming to have participated in the revolution did so for reasons related to freedom and social justice; a similarly large percentage did so to end corruption – a goal which combines issues of fairness and economic inequality. And 7 percent said they did so for the purely economic goal of ending unemployment. Calls for 'karama' and 'hurriya' – dignity and freedom – were as important as bread-and-butter issues.
Debates over identity and freedom thus played a major role in the Egyptian presidential elections. The DEDI-ACPSS survey found that voters were largely unable to distinguish presidential candidates' positions on the role of the state in the economy, while they had better understandings of each candidate's position on the relationship between Islam and the state. The survey identified three distinct, views in the population: preferences for no relationship, a moderate relationship and a strong relationship between Islam and the state.
Some Regimes 'Survived,' Others Didn't: Enthusiasm over the Arab Spring quickly gave way to gloomy talk of an Arab Winter. Observers discuss the region in terms of a tally sheet – with countries where regimes fell on one side and those that survived on another. Syria, engaged in a protracted struggle, the outcome of which is still uncertain, remains in the center.
Such tallies overstate the extent to which old regimes have been swept away. To date, there's a great deal of variation in change – from Tunisia and Libya, where the old regime was largely removed, to Egypt, where the struggle remains intense, and finally to Yemen, where one can question how much has ultimately changed with the unopposed election of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Moreover, in each of these cases, and elsewhere, long and tortuous transition processes continue. There is reason to caution against prematurely declaring the end of regime change – and certainly against claiming success or failure of democratization.
There is also reason to refrain from proclaiming the long-term survival of regimes which have thus far been spared. The uprisings alter perceptions of what is possible and desirable. The fall of Ben Ali erased the widespread perception that political change was impossible, while the difficult transitions and bloody, protracted conflict in Syria prompt some to question the wisdom of pushing for change. The experiences of neighboring countries, along with the many regional and international pressures, influence citizens on the sidelines and affect the possibilities of change. Lebanese and Jordanians, for instance, are divided in their views on conflict in neighboring Syria, and on the potential for change at home. Political rupture remains a possibility in these countries, and elsewhere.
The 2011 uprisings were of unprecedented size and impact, but the discontent was not entirely new nor solely the product of technologically savvy youth. Moreover, the uprisings were mobilized around governance failures that were felt far beyond economic conditions, including issues of national identity and dignity. These issues will play a critical role in the transitions ahead.
Finally, and most importantly, uprisings are far from over. Domestic, regional and international factors will continue shaping and reshaping contestation within Arab states – destabilizing some regimes, strengthening others and contributing to a fluid regional reformation. It's too early to tell exactly where such changes will lead, but not too soon to know they'll continue.
