Part of al-Qaeda's resiliency lies in its organizational structure. Derek Jones, a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, recently published a monograph with Joint Special Operations University entitled Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks. Jones's work represents an important contribution to how we think about networks like al-Qaeda, since many analysts' estimates of how much attrition will be enough to cripple it are no better than assumptions.
Jones argues that al-Qaeda and similar groups are clandestine cellular networks: clandestine in the sense that they are designed to be hidden, and cellular in the sense that they are compartmentalized to minimize damage when enemy forces neutralize some portion of the network. The logic of this structure is that it allows the organization to survive attrition, in line with the well-worn adage that by slowly eroding the opponent's will, a guerrilla network "wins by not losing."
One of Jones's overarching conclusions is that "the removal of single individuals, regardless of function, is well within the tolerance of this type of organizational structure." In other words, killing senior officers won't stop the group, nor is it likely to weaken it greatly without a broader strategy. (I think this point is overstated because some leaders truly are more capable than others, but it nonetheless provides important insight into what such structures are designed to accomplish.)
Has attrition within al-Qaeda overwhelmed its ability to absorb losses? It's hard to know: When al-Qaeda rebounded between 2002 and 2006, it did so in the shadows. At present, many aspects of the core's efforts to reestablish itself are similarly obscured.
We should avoid prematurely penning al-Qaeda's obituary. After all, this isn't the first time that a large percentage of observers considered the group to be dead.
