As for the terrorism charge, documents found in Daqduq's possession detail a variety of operations targeting coalition and Iraqi forces, including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnapping plots, attacks on helicopters, and small-arms assaults. As a master trainer, Daqduq was heavily involved in preparing special operatives to execute such attacks. A training manual he carried included specific tactical tips for successful operations. For example, when conducting a rocket attack against a coalition convoy, militants were instructed as follows: "launch two rockets at the target and the third one for insurance"; "shoot the first and second vehicle"; "each vehicle shoots two rockets (four rockets for every vehicle)"; "secure the place...and shoot visible soldiers"; and "shoot single shots and don't shoot on automatic."
The documents also reveal that Daqduq was personally involved in violent operations in Iraq. For example, his personal diary recounts his role in a plot to kidnap a British soldier. "The operation is to infiltrate two brothers into the base to detain a British soldier in the first brigade from the bathrooms by drugging him," he wrote. His notes also detail a meeting with operatives who were actually present at the attempted kidnapping, which failed due to the intervention of Iraqi soldiers. Other documents refer to his involvement in attacks on British headquarters at the Basra palace and the Shatt al-Arab Hotel.
Daqduq's diary also mentions discussions with operatives involved in IED bombings and small-arms fire against Iraqis and coalition forces in Diyala province: "Met with the brothers [and] the observers of Diyala province and I listened regarding the operations...We conducted eight explosive charge operations on both sides." His use of the first-person suggests that he was either personally involved in the attacks or, at minimum, saw himself as an integral part of the plot.
But what most grabbed the attention of senior coalition leaders was an "in-depth planning and lessons learned document" about the 2007 Karbala attack, outlining the extensive pre-operational surveillance, logistical preparation, and tactical drills the operatives had carried out. Both Daqduq and the Khazalis would eventually concede "that senior leadership within the Qods Force knew of and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack." According to Daqduq, "the Iraqi special groups could not have conducted this complex operation without the support and direction of the Qods Force."
Holding Hizbollah Accountable
In late February 2012, the U.S. government publicly announced the filing of military commission charges against Daqduq, as detailed in an eight-page charge sheet first issued secretly just days after he was turned over to Iraqi authorities. By the time an Iraqi appeals court upheld the decision to free him in June, Washington had already lodged a formal extradition request. To be sure, even a fair trial could have ended in Daqduq's acquittal on some or all of the charges. But failing to try him at all -- and on the basis of such clearly false procedural grounds -- suggests that something other than the rule of law is at play in the Iraqi judicial system.
For Washington, the question of whether or not this case goes to trial should be a litmus test of the Maliki administration's commitment to democratic principles, particularly the rule of law and separation of powers. At the moment, Baghdad has apparently concluded that the political cost of holding a senior Hizballah commander accountable -- in Iraq or the United States -- is too high. Baghdad wants to balance its relationships with Iran and Washington, and this case stands at the crux of the two. Accordingly, Washington must make clear at the highest levels of the Iraqi government that there will be tangible consequences to summarily freeing an Iranian proxy with American blood on his hands.
