How the U.S. Can Stabilize the Mideast

The path of US-Iran engagement in the above terms would by no means remove the option of future defensive war on Iran should it plausibly threaten to use such weapons unprovoked, or to wage aggressive war against its neighbours.

However, even such a graduated and “defensive war” option would need to be weighed carefully in the light of prevailing circumstances.

Israel’s role

Israel would be one of the main losers if the Middle East were to descend into greater chaos as a result of military strikes on Iran. Yet Israel’s hawkish leadership has been shrill in threatening its own “preventive war” on that country.

Unfortunately, Israel’s foreign policy hawks have been dangerously emboldened by several factors. The first is the forty years or so in which Israel has possessed the only (albeit “ambiguously” denied) nuclear weapons capacity in the region, not to speak of its being at a comparable level to China, France and the UK in terms of delivery and “second strike” capabilities.

This unchecked power has not been a stabilising force in the region, especially given that this has been heavily supported by US military aid over the same period. US domestic politics has also played a role with undue influence exerted by a loose coalition of forces favouring war.

Developing a rapprochement with Iran, as the US did with China, would not be easy. But the US does have the power to address the central issues constructively.

As discussed in journalist Stephen Kinzer’s book, there are many reasons for US foreign policy cooperation with Iran, not least in retrieving dangerous situations in Afghanistan and Iraq as the US withdraws as rapidly as its declining prestige will allow.

Australia’s role then and now

But the US would only take a less bellicose direction if there was effective pressure domestically and from the rest of the world, including from such allies as Australia, a country with a history of opposition to even-handedness on the Palestine question.

That Australia can play either positive or negative roles is well demonstrated by the related histories of our relations with China and Vietnam. Then opposition leader Gough Whitlam’s coinciding visit to China in 1971 indicated a degree of international awareness.

He set out to correct the then coalition government’s support of hawkish US policy directions evident in both its ill-conceived commitment to land-war in Asia and its ideologically-based opposition to normalising relations with China.

That pressure from the then coalition government did the US no favours and did nothing to advance our own security is a relevant lesson for Australia now.