Needless to say, this is precisely what the US should want to see happen in Syria, but is balking at, either inadvertently or intentionally. In contrast, a power-sharing arrangement would only allow the Iranians to keep a seat at the table-a net loss for the US and its allies.
All of this, of course, is assuming that Syria remains a unitary state. In fact, the Obama administration's policy seems to be a series of false assumptions. It assumed that economic and diplomatic pressure would convince Assad to leave. It then assumed that the conflict could be managed with ceasefires and negotiations leading to a "peaceful transition." It thus failed to game for the prospect that the fighting may continue until one side had attained total victory. Now the White House seems to be assuming that the opposition can attain such a victory without the US doing much to help, and that somehow this victory can be squared with preserving "state institutions" after Assad falls.
But the picture is never this neat. For instance, Assad may well fall in the Syrian interior and even in the major cities Aleppo and Damascus. However, he could well survive in Latakia and the Alawite coastal mountains.
An Alawite enclave would allow Assad to preserve his regime in contracted form. This enclave would essentially serve as an Iranian (and Russian) protectorate on the Mediterranean, thereby enabling Iran to maintain a bridgehead along the border with Lebanon and Turkey.
It is imperative, then, for the US not to lose sight of its actual strategic priority in Syria. That is the elimination of any scenario that allows Iran to keep a foothold in Syria, be that an Alawite enclave or a power-sharing deal. In other words, any measure of regime continuity is decisively not in the US interest. Ensuring the Syrian army and other illustrious "state institutions" like the mukhabarat remain intact is, therefore, not only delusional, but also self-defeating.
