Iranian Islands of Influence

On the one hand, brokering the agreement between the PYD-the PKK's Syrian affiliate-and the KNC would suggest that Barzani attempted to position himself as a mediator between Turkey and the PKK. On the other hand, the Kurdish leader made clear where he stood with regard to his strategic partnership with Turkey. Following a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Irbil at the beginning of the month, the two issued a joint statement stressing that "any attempt by any extremist group or organization to exploit the power vacuum [in Syria] will be considered a common threat and should be settled jointly" - a clear reference to the PKK.

Barzani, in other words, is trying to box in the PKK's Syrian affiliate. However, his power play and his budding strategic relationship with Turkey are bound to create a desire for a counterbalancing influence. This is where Iran comes in.

Tehran already has some friends among Barzani's rivals in Iraq. In addition, the conflict in Syria has also shown that Iran and the PKK can find room to work together. Iran's capture and release of PKK chief Murat Karay?lan last summer was seen by Turkey as an Iranian message that it could find common cause with the PKK against Ankara. As recently as last week, the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister made comments implying that a recent surge in PKK terror attacks in Turkey's southeast has the backing of Iran, and that the PKK was infiltrating Turkey from Iranian soil.

Rivalry between Kurdish groups and its interaction with regional power politics suggest that the current intra-Kurdish agreement will not hold down the road. Facing pressure from Barzani and his local allies, and the threat of Turkish military incursions, the PKK's Syrian branch could turn to Iran for support.

What's more, the Kurdish areas in Syria are not contiguous and it may very well end up that the PKK affiliate and the pro-Barzani parties control different areas, thereby creating a Kurdish subset of the broader Syrian civil war. This brings into focus the kind of fragmentation we might potentially see in Syria, which could in turn afford Iran additional islands of influence in northern Syria, aside from the Alawite region.

While Syria's fragmentation is not, per se, a primary concern for the U.S., eliminating Tehran's ability to project power in that country is. Syria is fracturing, and Iran will look for any opening, including exploiting the situation in the Kurdish region. Washington, meanwhile, currently has no policy to address this scenario.