US-Pakistan cooperation in the joint war against terror is at an all time low. Though NATO-ISAF supply routes have been re-opened and the ISI chief visited Washington recently, General Kayani has failed to take action against the Haqqani network, which has been operating against NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan from safe havens in Pakistan. Despite repeated US demands to address the insurgency in North Waziristan, the Pakistan Army has not yet launched counter-insurgency operations in this restive area, which is the hub of the TTP. It appears to be both unable and unwilling to do so.
The US and allies have become increasingly frustrated by Pakistan's failure to deal with al Qaeda and Taliban militants launching raids on US and NATO troops across the Durand Line. The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and other officials have been meeting General Kayani frequently to impress upon him the need to be more pro-active in counter-insurgency operations. Unilateral trans-border intervention against militants inside Pakistani territory by the United States is continuing through drone strikes. Trans-border ground action through Special Forces is likely to be approved if President Obama wins the November election.
The continuing stand-off between the Pakistan government and the judiciary over the prosecution of President Asif Ali Zardari for allegedly stashing huge sums of money in Swiss bank accounts is undermining political stability and adversely impacting governance. The underperformance of Pakistan's tottering economy is another cause for concern. Inflation is still raging in double digits and is having a crippling impact on the economy. If economic conditions continue to spin out of control, there is a possibility of much greater popular discontent and violence spreading across Pakistan.
The ruling party in Pakistan needs to make determined efforts to rein in the ISI from continuing to appease the Taliban, provide good governance and formulate sustainable economic policies. It must also initiate a consultation process with all the stakeholders for the formulation of a holistic and comprehensive national-level counter-insurgency strategy. At this juncture, the Pakistani military is in no shape to step into a potential political quagmire. However, if historical evidence is any guide, such restraint on the part of the military may yet prove to be fleeting if conditions in the country continue to deteriorate.
Pakistan is not yet a failed state, but it is a state with a failed leadership. Now that Musharraf is out of the way and Nawaz Shariff's urge to avenge his humiliation in 1999 has been satisfied, he should behave in a more statesman-like manner in the larger interests of his country. However, going by past experience, he is unlikely to do so. Political turmoil, internal instability, a floundering economy and weak institutions make for an explosive mix. The only deduction that can conceivably be drawn is that Pakistan is in for even greater difficulties ahead. The emerging situation does not augur well for strategic stability in Southern Asia.
