The talks, which had started last year, seem to have stalled after both sides stuck to their hardline positions. The Karzai government has also established contacts with the Taliban, but no headway has so far been made as the Taliban want only to talk with the US. The question remains whether the United States has a clear strategy for a political resolution of the Afghan crisis.
Islamabad maintains that ending the war won't be possible without a power-sharing agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. A political settlement in Afghanistan could also help Pakistan to deal more effectively with its own Taliban.
But Pakistani ambivalence about cracking down on Afghan insurgents operating from sanctuaries inside its territories - an unwillingness to burn old bridges - also raises questions about Pakistan's cooperation in ending the war in Afghanistan and allowing orderly withdrawal of coalition forces.
Since the start of the war in Afghanistan, remote tribal areas along Pakistan's border have become home for a lethal brew of Al Qaeda operatives, both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, and other jihadi groups fighting on both sides of the border.
Meanwhile, North Waziristan, the biggest of the seven tribal territories, has turned into a base for the Haqqani network, the most powerful Afghan Taliban faction fighting the coalition forces. Led by legendary former Afghan Mujahideen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, the network has been blamed for spectacular attacks on Kabul in the last year.
The group's close links with Al Qaeda have made the network the most dangerous outfit operating in eastern Afghanistan. The US pressures Pakistan to act against the network as violence escalated in the recent years. More than 1500 coalition troops and more than 2000 ISAF soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan since 2009.
Pakistan's refusal to act against the Haqqani network is a reflection of Islamabad's worries about the events that could transpire after the eventual pullout of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The Pakistani military establishment is convinced that a renewed civil war will break out if the withdrawal takes place without a political settlement in place. There's also fear of arch-rival India expanding its influence in post-withdrawal Afghanistan through a government dominated by members of the former Northern Alliance.
A decade-long war in Afghanistan has turned the country into a new battleground for Al Qaeda-linked militants, with devastating effects on Pakistan's economy and politics, threatening complete destabilization.
Thousands of Pakistani civilians and military personnel have been killed in terrorist attacks and fighting against the insurgents in the country's northwestern territories in recent years. Widespread violence has disrupted investment, pushing the economy toward the verge of bankruptcy.
Another serious concern is that withdrawal of NATO forces without a negotiated political mechanism in place could plunge tribal groups and factions of Afghanistan into a fierce contest over territory while also drawing surrounding countries, like Iran and Tajikistan, into the conflict.
Under such a scenario, the Pashtun-dominated Haqqani network remains a useful hedge for Pakistan against the uncertain outcome in Afghanistan and Indian influence. This policy of using such a proxy in the civil war could be disastrous for Pakistan's own stability. Civil war in Afghanistan could suck Pakistan deeper into the mire with disastrous consequences for the entire region.
