In the Iraq War from 2003 to 2009, many young men joined the insurgents fighting against the US-led coalition and also took part in actions against the Shi'a majority. In fighting the US forces, many of these young men were killed in combat, but others survived and now constitute a markedly dispersed cohort with combat experience against well-trained and heavily-armed US Army and Marine Corps units.
Thus, one of the effects of the wars has been to give rise to a combination of extensive IED capabilities, a great commitment to martyr attacks and paramilitary combat experience.
The Syrian Uprising
Following the initial development of the Arab Awakening in early 2011, there were rapid political changes in Tunisia and Egypt, some degree of reform in Morocco and Jordan, and an uprising and regime termination in Libya that required considerable intervention from NATO. From March 2011, a popular movement against the Assad regime in Syria developed but this was repressed with force by the regime. This slowly led to an insurgency which started with very limited coordination and few armaments. Within three months there was considerable aid forthcoming, principally from Saudi Arabia, and by September last year, there were predictions that the Assad regime would not last out the year.
This was a mistaken view, not least because the regime did have internal support that extended beyond the Alawi minority and also because it had the backing of Iran and Russia. The Syrian conflict has now evolved into a violent and devastating civil war that is made worse by being a double proxy conflict - at the regional level the strong and well-funded Saudi support for the rebels is matched by Iranian support for the regime, and at the global level, there is a fundamental difference between Russia wanting regime survival or at least a peaceful transition that protects its interests, and the United States wanting regime termination as soon as possible.
Jihadist Involvement
It is in this context that the growing influence of young jihadist paramilitaries becomes significant, especially in relation to the legacy elements of the War on Terror discussed above. At the same time, it is difficult to assess the degree of external jihadist involvement for three reasons:
The Assad regime has long exaggerated the involvement so as to label all opponents as terrorists.
The Syrian rebels are deeply reluctant to admit that jihadist elements are active because of the potential loss of Western support.
It is probable that US and other Western intelligence agencies have a reasonably accurate assessment of substantial jihadist strength but their political leaderships, too, are deeply reluctant to acknowledge this in public.
However, what is now clear is that there are substantial numbers of foreign paramilitaries active against the Assad regime, they are often operating in parallel with the Free Syrian Army, they are well-organised and competent and they number far more than recent US estimates of two hundred. Their involvement in the Syrian War appears to have accelerated since late last year and this coincides with an increase in martyr attacks and a substantial increase in the use of IEDs. In May of this year alone, there were around 700 IED detonations, and their use against the Assad regime's armoured vehicles appears to have been particularly effective given that these do not have the levels of anti-mine protection that US forces eventually developed for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to reputable public domain sources, there appear to be at least a thousand foreign paramilitaries, and there may be far more as numbers are rising. They include people from Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen, as well as from non-Arab Islamic countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. For many of them the war in Syria is more important than those in Afghanistan or Iraq because Syria is closer to Jerusalem.
The al-Qaida movement and its offshoots have long regarded the House of Saud as the most important "target" within the concept of the "near enemy", because it is the entirely unacceptable Keeper of the Two Holy Places, and have sought its downfall and replacement with acceptable Islamist governance. Beyond this though, is Jerusalem, the location of the Third Holy Place, and Syria is the most important part of the Jerusalem hinterland. Syria is therefore of great importance to the jihadist/al-Qaida world view and its "cleansing" of Christians and Islamic apostates (Alawis) is a core task in the mission to establish a proper Caliphate.
The foreign (and indeed the home-grown) jihadist element in Syria may still be in a minority within the rebellion but it is growing in significance. It is one reason why CIA personnel are operating actively in Turkey and trying to direct munitions and other materiel into the "right" sort of rebels and not the jihadists. It is also the reason why the Assad regime retains more support from Christians than might be expected, because they fear the regime, however autocratic, being replaced by something that from their confessional perspective is potentially much worse.
The war in Syria is becoming more violent, and the proxy element is now deep-seated, making it difficult for either side to prevail. This suggests that the war may continue for some time. Even if the Assad regime falls soon, the jihadist element already means influence in a post-Assad era. If it does not fall soon, then the longer it goes on the more likely the jihadist element will gain in influence. One of the most important consequences of this is that against all expectations, the al-Qaida idea could increase once more in significance. This could have disastrous consequences beyond Syria.
Conclusion
In these circumstances, there is an urgent need to encourage any initiative that seeks to bring the conflict to a negotiated settlement as soon as possible. However difficult, every effort has to be made to encourage this. In particular, it would be wise to offer support to the new UN representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, in what will prove to be a very difficult post but one for which he is certainly well-suited, given his experience. In addition, intelligence and policing efforts directed towards cutting finances to violent Islamist groups in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere should also take account of these developments in Syria at an early date. The lesson from over a decade of counter-terrorism activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere is that sending in overwhelming force later is counterproductive.
There is one final element that may be significant. Russia provides the most important major diplomatic support for the Assad regime, but Russia is itself experiencing an increase in Islamist violence in areas that have previously been considered peaceful and stable. The most notable of these have been incidents in Kazan, the capital of the internal republic of Tatarstan, and elsewhere in the republic. If Russian support for the Assad regime in Syria helps provide a motivation for radical jihadists to be more active within Russia, it is possible that Russia may be more willing to consider more active diplomatic cooperation towards regime transition in Syria.
