In contrast to what Saber described as Morsi's accommodation, Mamdouh Ismail, vice president of the Salafist al-Asala party, claimed that "the Salafist call was the strongest Islamic entity defending the prophet." Another official in the Salafist al-Nour party noted that he offered the Brotherhood's leadership an opportunity to participate in the rally, but they never responded. The Salafists were attacking Morsi's Islamic credentials.
The response of officials from the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party was essentially to charge that the protests were aimed at "embroiling" the government-read: the Brotherhood-in a diplomatic crisis with the US. This retort and Morsi's delayed, or initial lack of, response to the assault on the embassy suggest that the Egyptian president may have tried to have it both ways. On the one hand, he could not simply cede the platform of Islamic pride to the Salafists. On the other hand, he cannot have them sabotage his relationship with the US.
Indeed, there are other landmines that the Salafists planted for Morsi in the lead-up to the attack on the embassy. As the Algerian daily al-Jaza'ir News put it in a sharp news analysis piece, the scene at the US Embassy was merely one "battleground between the Salafists and the Muslim Brothers." Since Morsi has assumed office, the two sides have clashed on a host of issues ranging from the position on Islamic law to standing by the actress Ilham Shahin.
However, as al-Jaza'ir News noted, "The most important arena of conflict is the military operations conducted by the Egyptian Army in order to purge the Sinai of Islamist extremists." This was in reference to the operation that Morsi conducted in the wake of an attack in Sinai last month that killed 16 Egyptian border guards.
Egyptian policy in the Sinai is a highly sensitive issue since it is seen as perhaps the defining marker of the difference between the new government and the Mubarak regime. Hazem Abu Ismail, the Salafist figure, contended that Morsi's maneuver in Sinai, dubbed Operation Eagle, was illegal. Perhaps even more significantly, none other than Ayman al-Zawahiri also attacked Morsi for the Sinai campaign. Zawahiri's criticism preceded the assault on the US Embassy during the Cairo demonstrations, where his brother Mohammad was notably present.
Zawahiri lashed out at Morsi in a statement timed to coincide with the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, charging that his government was "guarding Israel's borders." He then called on the "honorable, free officers in the Egyptian Army, and they are many, not to be guards for Israel's borders, or defend its borders, and not to partake in the siege of our people in Gaza."
Zawahiri's language unmistakably hearkens back to Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah's tirade against Mubarak during the Gaza war of 2008-09. Nasrallah similarly appealed to the officers of the Egyptian armed forces not to "guard the borders of Israel" and to open the Rafah crossing.
The Salafists, therefore, have systematically sought to paint Morsi as the reincarnation of Mubarak. Their move was calculated to show him as someone lacking Islamic credentials, an American lackey, and an upholder of the previous regime's relationship with Israel. What's more, it followed a well-established tradition in Arab politics. Throughout the twentieth century, Arab states and political actors have framed their various civil wars and struggles for power as a fight against external enemies, be they Britain, Israel or the US.
Attacking the US Embassy was a perfect way to embroil Morsi-the equivalent of a bank shot in a game of pool. The anti-Islam video was just an instrument that served these local dynamics. The new Egyptian political class was simply conducting politics as usual. If the US is going to navigate the terrain of post-Arab Spring politics, it needs to recognize these dynamics of inter-Islamist and inter-Arab competition for power and prestige.
