Maintaining good relations with Iran is important for Russia for many reasons. Both are Caspian Sea states and, as the incumbent naval powers, share an interest in regulating the build-up of other Caspian navies and in precluding the introduction of any more naval forces into the sea. They also have common interests regarding the resolution of legal disputes in the Caspian and are united in opposing the construction of oil and gas pipelines on the seabed. Iran, furthermore, is an important customer for Russia's arms and particularly its nuclear-power technologies. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Iran has since the dissolution of the Soviet Union helped Russia to keep in check the spread of militancy in the states of the South Caucasus and the Russian North Caucasus. A rupture in relations with Tehran could reverse this process and lead to a deepening of the security problems that Russia endures on its restive southern flank.
As well as being an attempt to stay in Iran's good books, Russia's stance on Syria is informed by worries about rising instability in states close to Syria. Russia fears what might happen if a collapse of the Syrian state resulted in the proliferation of Syria's large cache of chemical weapons. It worries too about the potential for events in Syria to stoke a range of deeply destabilising dynamics in the Middle East, by setting Muslims against other religious groupings and Sunnis against Shias, and by encouraging militant extremists.
Months before Western governments went public with their concerns that fighters aligned with al-Qaeda were active in Syria, the phenomenon was noted with alarm by Russian state officials and commentators - including among the latter some who are ordinarily trenchant critics of their own government. Unlike Western powers, Russia condemned the attack - reportedly by a suicide bomber - on the national security headquarters in Damascus on 18 July 2012, which killed the defence minister and his deputy. Many in Russia were at a loss to understand why Western states were either turning a blind eye to the growing presence of terrorists in Syria or supporting them with arms and other forms of assistance. The murder on 11 September 2012 of Christopher Stevens, the US ambassador to Libya, by militants in Benghazi was regarded by Russian commentators as a tragic justification of their critique of Western policy - that by making common cause with extremists, the West is playing with fire.
Western states share Russia's concerns about the risk of violence among different ethnic and religious groups, and of the encouragement of terrorists. But Russia and the West differ on the solution, because the former backs Assad to resolve Syria's crisis whereas the latter insists on Assad departing - despite the huge accompanying uncertainties.
Stakes in Syria
Finally, Russia has a range of national interests in Syria itself: a naval base; a large arms market; other commercial opportunities; a friendly government; and a large number of nationals and other people who might look to Russia for sanctuary. The Russian naval facility at Tartus is its only such base beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union. It serves as a refuelling station rather than as a base for Russian vessels and currently has limited utility to a navy that is suffering the effects of three decades of under-investment. Nevertheless, it represents a toehold for Russia in the eastern Mediterranean until such a time as Russia's navy is able to make its presence felt in the region on a more sustained basis.
Tartus is also the base for Russian military personnel supporting the long-established arms trade between the two countries. Research from the Russian think tank CAST shows that Syria was Russia's second-largest arms customer in 2011, after China; Syria accounted for 15% of total sales of $3.7 billion. The sales included air-defence systems, anti-ship missiles, helicopters and tank upgrades. The sum of these deliveries dwarfed Russian sales to the rest of the Middle East, including Algeria, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Egypt. Russia has a reasonable expectation of continuing sales to Syria because its military equipment is well established within the Syrian armed forces. Western sanctions on Syria have also increased the opportunity for Russia's oil, gas and power firms to invest in the country. This is a further benefit for Russia of having an ally such as Assad in power, in a region where Russia has few firm friends.
Within Syria, Russia also has plenty of its own nationals to worry about. The number of military personnel is at least several hundred. In addition, because in the 1980s many Syrians studied in Russian universities, there are a large number of Russian nationals who are married to Syrians and reside in Syria. Estimates vary between 10,000 and 40,000, and it should be noted that this counts only Russian passport holders rather than their family members. For a variety of reasons, the Russian community is regarded as supportive of Assad. If the regime falls, its situation in Syria could become very awkward, to the point that it might not be tenable.
There is a still-larger number of people, estimated at 50,000-100,000, who might look to Russia for sanctuary in the event of the continued deterioration of security in Syria. These are the ethnic Circassians, whose ancestors left their homelands close to the Black Sea and resettled in the Levant in the second half of the nineteenth century, as tsarist Russia expanded. They too are considered to be part of Assad's minority coalition, and many of them reside in places that have seen heavy fighting and popular displacement. Moscow is concerned about the prospect of Circassians relocating from Syria to the febrile republics of the North Caucasus, where their Russian kin reside. This is mainly because of the pressure that such a movement would put on labour markets and government resources in the North Caucasus. But it also reflects wariness about dealing with Circassians as the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi approach. Sochi is ancient Circassian land, and elements of the Circassian diaspora wish to use the games as an opportunity to draw attention to what they regard as the Circassian genocide of the nineteenth century.
Not for turning
The depth and range of Russia's interests in Syria set it apart from the other permanent members of the Security Council. These relate directly to matters of importance for any government: defence-sector jobs, export and investment opportunities, the cultivation and maintenance of allies, and avoiding an influx of refugees. Russia's defence of the international legal precept of non-interference in sovereign states is likewise primarily a matter of self-interest, though it should be noted that Russia has been consistent on the question of foreign intervention since the Arab uprisings began (in contrast to Western states). Russia is not, however, merely looking out for itself in the Syrian case. The increase in militant activity in Syria - as well as the death of the US ambassador to Libya - has strengthened the conviction of Russia's decision-makers that they have a better sense than their Western counterparts of how stability and security in the Middle East should be maintained. It is difficult to see that conviction wavering any time soon.
