In spite of the fact that the Kurds live in four different countries there is contagious effect, mutual influence and synergy between all four. The transnational movement has gathered momentum thanks to the geopolitical changes in the region, the greater assertiveness of the Kurds, the crucial role of the diaspora, the new media and most importantly the de facto state, the Kurdistan Regional government, which has become the magnet and the model for all the Kurds.
Indeed, the concept of Kurdistan underwent important transformations. While in the past localism of each part was the order of the day, now Greater Kurdistan becomes part and parcel of the new Kurdish discourse.
For the new generation the center is no longer the state but Greater Kurdistan. This is illustrated in such terminology which refers to the communities not according to their states but to their parts in a Kurdistani unit. Thus, North refers to Kurdistan in Turkey, South Kurdistan to Iraq, East Kurdistan to Iran and West Kurdistan to Syria.
After this panoramic overview I would like to look briefly at each of the Kurdish regions separately. The repercussions on the KRG are immense, although there was no revolution there modeled on the Arab ones. The developments in the Middle East catapulted the KRG to the position of the actual leader of the other parts of Kurdistan. The KRG's pivotal role is evident in the conferences it holds where Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan and the world at large participate; in the bases it provides to political groups and the refuge it grants to fleeing Kurds; and finally in its becoming the Mecca for political parties which come for support, consultation or mediation.
The fact that the KRG remained an island of stability and prosperity won it greater legitimacy in the world, especially against the background of the instability in Iraq and the tectonic changes in the region.
All this increased its political maneuverability vis-a-vis its neighbors and forced it hand with regard to Baghdad.
The real revolution took place among the Kurds of Syria who were until quite lately a silent minority, insulated from the rest of the world. Many analysts doubted that such a community, fragmented politically and geographically and which moreover lacked the natural gift of impregnable mountains enjoyed by the other parts of Kurdistan, could indeed muster the power to play any important role in the Kurdish scene.
And yet the unbelievable happened. Within a short while the Kurds of Syria turned into a player to be reckoned with.
How did this come about? The fact that the Kurds of Syria reside in the geographical and political periphery only helped them to take the initiative, far from the watching eyes of the government and the other opposition parties. The Assad regime's struggle for survival forced him to turn a blind eye to developments in the Kurdish region and even to turn the Kurds into an ally of sorts against the other parts of the opposition. The close ties between the Turkish PKK and the Syrian PYD were further cemented by the souring relations between Damascus and Ankara, pushing Damascus to employ both the PKK and PYD against its short-lived ally. However, the main fuel for the Kurdish movement was years of assimilation, Arabization and the effacing of Kurdish identity, in the double sense of the word.
