These concerns were not baseless. After all, US officials have expressed their belief that efforts to achieve military victory would only prolong the violence-indicating that their priority was not the regime's defeat so much as stopping the violence. The Russians responded in kind, declaring that a decisive military victory in Syria was unattainable. Since the US remained opposed to militarily supporting the opposition, the logical implication is that a negotiated settlement was the only path forward. Therefore, Brahimi's mission continues to enjoy the Obama administration's backing.
Beyond the diplomatic masquerade, however, the heart of the problem is that, almost two years into the Syrian revolution, both Obama's policy, and his desired endgame, are still obscure. The only discernible constant has been Obama's resolute rejection of any form of intervention in Syria.
Accordingly, preserving a parallel track with Moscow is essential to the White House. It's not that Washington really believes that the Russians are likely to support Western and US-allied regional interests in Syria. As Aaron David Miller recently wrote, nobody he knew in the administration "ever believed that [going through the Russians] would actually solve this thing."
Enlisting Russian support was a cynical ploy. With Washington's stated preference for a "peaceful solution," talking to the Russians enabled the administration to maintain the pretense of meaningful diplomatic activity, all while allowing it to blame the lack of any breakthrough on Moscow. Lavrov was right in saying that some in the West were "praying" that Russia continues to block intervention, "as sanctioning it would mean they must act."
The White House is happy to run out the clock doing its two-step with Vladimir Putin, knowing full well that neither the Russians nor the rebels, and clearly not Assad, will change their stated positions. As Ambassador Robert Ford noted, "three times the Russians have said they would pressure Assad and have done nothing."
The difference between Washington's cynicism and Moscow's is that the latter's is strategically focused. The Russians are acutely aware that, in reality, they don't have a hand in this game. They have repeatedly said that they have no way to influence Assad's decisions. Instead, Moscow knows that the myth of its centrality in Syria is a creation of the Obama administration. Washington gave them the opening, and they've milked it.
The real problem is what the US envisions for the endgame in Syria. While Washington continues to insist on Assad's departure, it has nevertheless accepted several highly problematic points, not least being the formation of a so-called "national unity" government with regime elements, a proposal consistent with its earlier insistence on preserving "state institutions," such as the security services. Both stipulations would only ensure a continued seat at the table for the outside patrons of these elements and institutions, namely Iran and Russia. Thus, Washington's cynicism, without any clear strategic objectives, is unjustifiable.
