Following the Paris murders, officials in Ankara have again expressed concern about Öcalan's authority over factions that are "influenced by different power centers." With Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani moving the Kurdistan Regional Government closer in alliance with Turkey, the militants in Qandil would naturally turn to Iran to sustain the struggle with Turkey. A senior PKK adviser acknowledged as much last year: "Iran influences the PKK because the PKK is based on the Iranian border. When you fight a party, you have to find a support from some other party." Tehran has also reportedly sought to engineer a rapprochement between elements of the PKK and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, whom Barzani tried to remove from office through a no-confidence vote in parliament last year.
Iran's interest, then, is to prevent the Kurds from moving closer to, or at least normalizing relations with, Turkey, and to have a direct influence on the trajectory of Kurdish politics and leadership. So, whereas Erdal may be challenging Öcalan, Iran's sights are set on Barzani. After all, it was with Barzani's sponsorship that the prospective negotiations between the Turks and the PKK were supposed to take place in Erbil. Ankara took this decision with an eye to further enhancing Barzani's prestige as the main Kurdish leader and interlocutor.
This comes at a time when Jalal Talabani's failing health has taken him out of the picture, leaving the future of his party up in the air. The absence of Talabani, who historically has had closer relations with Iran, is likely to increase Tehran's aggressive efforts to coopt Kurdish parties in Iraq to push against Barzani and Turkey. Ensuring the PKK stays in its orbit, and firmly against Turkey, is part of the same picture.
There are repercussions for Syria as well, where Erdal, according to one Kurdish analyst, commands the loyalty of a powerful wing inside the Syrian affiliate of the PKK, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which has fought Barzani's attempts at projecting influence on the Syrian Kurdish scene. Needless to say, countering Barzani's efforts in Syria is also an Iranian interest. On a number of levels, then, there is a convergence of interests between Iran and Erdal's faction.
The assassination of Sakine Cansiz is likely inextricably linked to this complex power struggle. The Kurds are at a sensitive juncture, but they remain an arena for Turkish-Iranian rivalry. And it is precisely at this moment that Iran wants to make sure it has a dominant say on the balance of power inside the Kurdish leadership and the direction of Kurdish politics.
