In all this, however, a clear distinction must be made between the many individual campaigns and actions and any notion of an existential (or even generation-long) threat to the west. In reality, the main emphasis and motivation of particular groups is rooted in almost every case to the specific circumstances of the country or territory concerned.
Nigeria, where Boko Haram is mainly focused on opposing the Nigerian state, is a case in point. The group received a huge boost in 2009 when its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in police custody and security forces subsequently killed many hundreds of its supporters. But, different jihadi factions often have diverse emphases that can lead to splits, though sometimes the breakaway group retains an affiliation with the larger. Boko Haram, for example, has lost members to a faction called Ansaru.
Ansaru split from Boko Haram in part because its adherents see themselves as part of a more transnational movement that maintains links with those such as al-Shaabab. But since Ansaru is the weaker component, it is other factors that will decide whether the wider jihadi collective moves in their direction. In brief - and where Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria too are concerned - the extent to which the transnational vision is enhanced will depend less on the jihadis' own endeavours than on how the west responds.
The echo
This is as true in Mali as anywhere. In the coming weeks, French troops may well dislodge the northern rebels from some of the larger towns, though - unless the French then agree to a drawdown and offer a degree of negotiation - the war will likely morph into a long-lasting guerrilla conflict. If the French remain, the agenda will be set by the core elements of "remote-control" war: armed drones, targeted assassination, special forces, privatised military, and repeated air-strikes.
The risk here is that even with no formal declaration, the way the war in northern Africa is conducted (including the more intensive use of drones, as in Yemen and Somalia) will begin to resemble other spaces of the "war on terror", and encourage the view that the immediate enemy is indeed a pernicious transnational threat that can only be controlled by military force. In adopting this approach, the western forces will be doing exactly what Osama bin Laden's successors want.
The very first column in this series, published shortly after 9/11, suggested that al-Qaida supported the attack partly to set a trap for the United States and incite it into an extreme military reaction (see "Afghanistan: the problem with military action", 28 September 2001). That the lure worked was to be confirmed by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the zealous rhetoric of George W Bush's speeches of 2002-03 that accompanied them.
The world, in short, has been here before - yet a mere decade on, its most powerful leaders have learned so little.
