The UK is neither the first nor the only country to go through a phase of dominant Eurosceptic populism. In fact, since the eruption of the Euro-crisis, nearly every European country has had its moment of Euro-catharsis: that is, the moment when the country needed to decide which price it was ready to pay to stay in Europe - and for most, to stay in the Euro. Most, although painfully, gave a bold ‘yes' as an answer, despite a high, sometimes very high price: Greeks are sacrificing their society as a whole and the prospects of many generations for a reform programme that might allow them to stay in the Euro, just because the Greek narrative holds that this is still a better option than being left alone and risking a return to the Generals.
Similarly, in Italy, the country ousted a sluggish leader to regain the esteem a European founding member deserves. In Spain, the country - agonisingly enough to be sure - accepted its painful passage through a period of 50% youth unemployment, because the national narrative has been linked to Europe since the fall of Franco. For these countries, arguably much more negatively affected by the Euro-crisis than the UK, there is simply no point to give up on Europe, even if the current price for this decision is extremely high.
Finland and the Netherlands both suffered waves of populist temptation - Wilders and the True Finns - but both civil societies, after this incursion into chauvinism, had the energy to bring the public discourse on Europa back to the European mainstream. The Netherlands did this when they voted Wilders down in their last elections in September 2012, making a clear statement that the country is not willing to renounce Europe quite yet. In this context, the mainstream European discourse was not that Europe is fine as it is, but that Europe is important, and so we need to make it better.
Even Germany, which never had a populist party, had its moment of being seduced by the prospect of moving beyond Europe and 'going global alone'. Confronted with the price to pay for the various Greek bail-outs, Germany was indeed tempted to 'go BRICS', flirt with China (and Russia), and forget about Europe and its home base.
The German moment of catharsis came with Libya, when it realized how lonely it feels to be in bed with countries which do not share the same set of values; not to speak of the moment when it realised that in absolute terms (and not in terms of relative growth) German trade with China is still largely overrated, and far less than Germany's trade relations with Europe. Nevertheless, with a public discourse that had degenerated into blaming 'lazy Greeks' and fuelling inflation fears on breakfast TV shows, Germany was about to lose its destiny by a hair's breadth to the enemies of the Euro and admirers of the D-Mark, who sprouted like mushrooms all over the prime-time TV shows, spreading inflation hysteria. And it was hard to argue against them, even if the most solid data clearly spelt out how Germany benefits from the single market.
Finally, after an assessment of its policy choices, unbiased analysis of the costs and benefits of staying in the Euro, and, most importantly, by re-contextualizing its geostrategic, historical and political needs and its geographic situation, Germany was able to u-turn the Euro-discussion, and to come back to a reaffirmed commitment to Europe. The moment of catharsis, the moment of temptation, was over.
Two to go: one little piggy
This story might be instructive for the UK, as two of the big three European countries still have to face the moment when they define the price they are willing to pay for Europe. The new French President, François Hollande, is in the same predicament. He thought he could circumvent the price to pay, and steer Europe towards lefty economic policy. His government is just realising that their only option is probably to go for a 'Mitterrand II' scenario, implying the restructuring of the French economy to make France fit for Euroland, to go with the political modernisation of France, the task in which the government is currently engaged. Tackling long-delayed structural reforms will be France's moment of catharsis in which she re-commits herself to Europe and the Euro, by paying the necessary price - as nothing is free, especially a genuine, deep economic and monetary union.
