The results of Serbia's 2012 elections, which saw the incumbent pro-European administration ousted from power by considerably more nationalistic candidates with ties to Serbia's wartime leadership, were greeted with dismay in many countries. But rather than reverting to the bellicose rhetoric of the 1990s, as some had feared, Serbia's new leaders are deploying a strategy of pragmatism in tackling the country's most enduring issues.
Boris Tadic and his Democratic Party (DS) were replaced by Tomislav Nikolic, a former extreme nationalist, who was sworn in as president in June, and Ivica Dacic, the former spokesman of Slobodan Milosevic, who became prime minister in July.
During its first six months the new administration has pursued the same foreign policy as the last government: it has continued Serbia's bid to become a member of the European Union; Nikolic, though expressing his love of Russia, has not embarked on an overtly pro-Russian foreign policy; meanwhile, Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia's defence minister, has actually been consolidating ties with the United States and its military.
However, the new government faces considerable challenges if it is to make meaningful progress in dealing with long-standing issues and avoid a double-dip recession. To this end, key ministers have been allotted responsibility for Serbia's most enduring issues: Dacic has been charged with looking after the EU-sponsored dialogue with Kosovo, Vucic's main brief is anti-corruption, and Mladjan Dinkic, of the United Regions of Serbia coalition, is in charge of the economy.
Kosovo
The European Union began in 2011 a dialogue that aims to normalise relations between Serbia and Kosovo, and significant early progress was made. Although Serbia has no intention of officially recognising Kosovo's independence, its priority is to find a workable modus vivendi, which it needs in order to move forward with its EU membership plans. It hopes to get the green light to begin full accession talks in June or December.
Upon coming to power, Nikolic said he wanted the bilateral dialogue to focus more on finding a workable and permanent political arrangement between the two nations rather than on technical issues, significant though they may be, such as border management. The surprise is that, not only has this happened, with four meetings so far between Dacic and his opposite number Hashim Thaci, the prime minister of Kosovo, but also that the two clearly get on and are able to do business together. (Thaci is widely believed in Serbia, where he is a much-reviled figure, to have been behind an alleged plot in 1999 to kidnap Serbs and murder them in order to sell their organs - something he has always denied.) In a further sign of progress there are plans for Nikolic to meet Ahtifete Jahjaga, the president of Kosovo, on 6 February in Brussels.
Dacic argues that only this government, with its nationalist credentials, has the ability to strike a lasting deal with the ethnic Albanian leadership of Kosovo. In January the Serbian parliament passed a resolution that outlined Belgrade's aims for the talks, which include - as an opening gambit - seeking autonomy for Serbs who reside within Kosovo.
A week later, in an attempt to demonstrate his tough stance before preparing to make concessions in talks with Thaci, Dacic followed through on a threat to remove a monument to guerrillas killed fighting Serbian security forces in the predominantly ethnic Albanian Presevo Valley region of south Serbia in a rebellion which ended in 2001. The memorial had been built in front of Presevo's town hall. Angry Kosovars then responded by smashing dozens of Serbian gravestones in Kosovo.
Dacic's personal preference would probably be to partition Kosovo, which would mean keeping the Serbian-inhabited north and even giving Kosovo part of the Presevo Valley in exchange. However, this is not on the table at the moment, as Western policymakers worry that this would fuel separatist demands by Serbs in Bosnia and Albanians in Macedonia.
Tackling corruption
One key EU demand is that Serbia, like all the western Balkan nations, cracks down on organised crime and corruption. Dacic's cooperation on Kosovo then is motivated both by national and personal interest. While helping to move Serbia forward, Dacic is hoping to prove himself an indispensable interlocutor in the eyes of the EU and the US, which might come to his defence were he to fall under pressure to quit. Dacic was interior minister in the last government (a post he retains), but many in that government are believed to have prospered to an unusual degree.
