Two years after the uprising that ended the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt remains unsettled. Repeated changes to the rules of its political system have made for a bumpy and contentious transition in which many interested parties - the military, the judiciary, Islamist factions, the fragmented secular opposition, anarchist groups and labour movements - are jostling to impose themselves.
In January 2013, following several days of street violence, Egypt's defence minister and armed forces commander General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi issued a warning: 'Disagreement [between political factions] on running the affairs of the country may lead to the collapse of the state and threatens the future of the coming generation.' This alarming assessment reflected deep concerns in the military - and in society more broadly - about Egypt's trajectory and the capacity of the new government to run the country effectively.
In recent months, the Muslim Brotherhood - the Islamist movement behind President Muhammad Morsi - is perceived to have carried out a power grab. Executive orders were issued giving Morsi additional authority - later rescinded following protests. A draft constitution provoked controversy over its clauses on religion and because of anaemic political reforms, but was passed in a referendum on a low turnout. A sense that the Brotherhood was appropriating power has been compounded by appointments in the civil service, a crackdown on the press and a failure to fulfil political promises.
These events have precipitated a deterioration in public order and the economy. Political brinkmanship ahead of legislative elections in April could deepen divisions in society further still.
Morsi in power
Since his election in June 2012, Morsi has become a polarising figure. His narrow electoral victory was won by obtaining reluctant backing in the final round from secular groups who led the 2011 revolution (after the Brotherhood recanted on its initial promise not to field a candidate for the presidential election). Popular mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was sidelined from politicsunder the Mubarak regime, was demonstrated by the considerable support for the losing candidate, Ahmed Shafik, a former military officer and Mubarak establishment figure who was recently charged with the misappropriation of public funds. Morsi himself was not the Brotherhood's first choice as presidential candidate: it instead favoured Khairat al-Shater, a wealthy businessman widely seen as its prime political leader, who was disqualified over a prior conviction.
Morsi, at first seen as a weak president overshadowed by a dominant military, moved with surprising speed to consolidate power. In August 2012, the killing of Egyptian soldiers in an incident on the increasingly lawless Sinai Peninsula gave him the opportunity to overhaul the military's leadership by sidelining its top two commanders, Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and General Sami Hafez Anan. Heading the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the two men had led the country's political transition following Mubarak's resignation in February 2011. Al-Sisi succeeded Tantawi as the head of the SCAF.
Whether or not their ousting resulted from a secret deal between the Brotherhood and younger officers remains a matter of controversy. But the move won goodwill towards Morsi among revolutionaries who saw the military as a brake on democracy and as being intent on preserving its autonomy and privileges.
