Events in the Mediterranean and Middle East unravel at a breathtaking place. As the multilayered dynamics of a historic transformation play out, public debate oscillates erratically from the first hurrahs for an Arab spring to the somber talk about a chilling Arab winter. It is beyond the glimmer of a doubt that the transformation underway is not linear. It's difficult to imagine how it could have been. But a new equilibrium is far from sight and the historic responsibility to ensure that, ebbs and flows notwithstanding, it represents a qualitative leap forward from where it began cannot be eluded.
While being conscious that it is only one among several players on a complex chessboard, this is a historic responsibility that Europe cannot ignore. As far as "Brussels" goes, much has been done. But to punch its full weight and counter-cyclically move against the sinister signs of a stolen revolution, more politics and strategy in the EU's response are sorely needed. In the past, the political-strategic impulse behind the Union's Mediterranean policies came from southern European member states. The current economic crisis means that at this historical juncture this ought to be more the case, not less.
The box of tricks
The European Union has not watched idly as its southern neighbourhood has grappled with the insidious challenges of political change. To its credit, it rather rapidly changed its tune, publically acknowledging its past flaws in supporting authoritarian rule in the ephemeral pursuit of energy, migration and security interests. Policy-wise it followed suit by bolstering its presence in the region through regular high level visits, an EU office in Benghazi, and the appointment of an EU Special Representative. More concretely, it increased by €700 million the €3.5 billion already earmarked for the Mediterranean in the 2011-13 period, designating part of these funds to specific instruments that support political transition.
It provided financial support for existing bodies such as the Anna Lindh Foundation and established new instruments such as the Civil Society Facility and the newly-minted European Endowment for Democracy. Aware of the deepening socio-economic problems along its southern shores, the EU approved negotiation directives for Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, set-up Task Forces to coordinate public and private European investment in Tunisia and Jordan, launched an agriculture development initiative, and declared its intention to reach mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia, the first step before moving on to consider visa facilitation.
All this fits, broadly speaking, in the EU box of tricks. The EU has fine-tuned its existing instruments and has added new ones to the mix. But it has not engaged in "out-of-the-box" thinking and has certainly not cast its policies within a broader political-strategic approach to the region. Two years into the Arab uprisings, a strategy centred on a shared European appreciation of the challenge at hand, the desired end goals and the most effective way to pursue them has not been elaborated. EU institutions, and specifically the European External Action Service, have done their part. But they have not been followed by the member states.
This has meant, in part, that the EU has even failed to deliver on some of its commitments on paper. On the movement of people for instance, not only have mobility partnerships yet to see the light of day, but we are far from witnessing any meaningful increase in regular migration from the region, while the influx of irregular migrants has been promptly tackled through strengthened border controls, a more muscular border agency - Frontex - and swiftly renegotiated agreements with the new Libyan authorities.
Propelled by crisis
What explains the EU's state of strategic disarray? As all things global, the Mediterranean has been the indirect victim of the Eurozone crisis. The crisis, by far the most existential in Europe's painstaking integration project, has predictably deepened Europe's political navel gazing. It has bolstered protectionist instincts and zipped up the EU's purse, making original calls for a Marshall Plan for the Mediterranean fast fade from the European political lexicon. Southern Europe has been in the eye of the storm of the crisis, although historically speaking the political-strategic impulse behind EU initiatives for the Mediterranean has always come from... southern Europe. Regardless of their success, the Euro-Arab dialogue of the 1970s, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the 5+5 dialogue of the 1990s or the Union for the Mediterranean of the 2000s were all southern European brainchildren. Put differently, it is difficult to imagine an EU strategy for the Mediterranean whose roots do not lie deeply in Mediterranean Europe.
The economic crisis gripping Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal (and to a lesser extent France) has zeroed for the time being the political space for strategic thinking; more so for strategic action. Beyond short-term military interventions and knee-jerk reactions to stem migration, southern European states have neither developed long-term bilateral strategies for the region, nor have they taken the lead to reignite an EU-wide initiative. They have drastically reduced their bilateral commitments in the region, relapsing on a concern for "vital interests" and "traditional partners", alongside a rather infantile intra-EU competition over who gets in first to the political-economic openings of a region in flux.
But it is precisely the economic crisis that should propel southern Europe to jump into the driver's seat of the EU's Mediterranean policies. It is the crisis that increases rather than reduces both the interest and the value of a southern European push for a political and economic change in the Mediterranean within an EU framework. Being currently perceived as an economic burden in some northern member states, southern Europe would demonstrate its key role in fostering an effective EU role in the world.
Economic engagement
As far as economic interests are concerned, southern European members not only represent the major trading partners of the Mediterranean partners, but could have much to gain from deeper and more coordinated responses amongst each other and with other regional actors to support the joint economic development of the area. In southern Europe, despite a resilient capacity in design and creating global brands, the crisis has taken a harsh toll on growth and productivity. Boosting competitiveness by reforming labour and product markets and upgrading innovation, education and public sector efficiency is of the essence. Doing so by engaging the Mediterranean economically could represent an important way forward.
Yet the paucity of funds and credit lines have curtailed initiatives in this direction. In view of this, partnering with regional actors such as Turkey, which boasts impressive growth rates and market penetration in the region (but which still lacks the know-how to become a high tech, high productivity country), could benefit southern Europe and the southern Mediterranean alike. South European firms could gain from Turkey's dynamism and entrepreneurial spirit especially when it comes to opening to new markets. Much like Germany was the lead economic engine in Eastern Europe's development, southern Europe and Turkey could assume a similar role for the southern Mediterranean economic transformation.
