Another cultural predisposition among the Palestinian Arabs has to do with combating terrorism. Maj.- Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, former head of the IDF's Research and Assessment Division, and currently security adviser to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, observed that, "There is a huge difference in the Palestinian view between law enforcement, which is seen as legitimate, and anti-terrorism, which is not seen as legitimate. The US confuses the two."
This assessment has never been properly assimilated by US authorities involved with the training program.
The PA has no laws against money laundering for terror groups; PA statutes do not define any group as a terrorist organization. There has never been action against Hamas undertaken by PA security forces out of an anti-terrorist ideological conviction.
We might ask then, why American government and military officials have blithely ignored these realities, instead of proceeding according to their own version of the situation: a version that is likely doomed to fail.
But even beyond these basic cultural facts lie other problems. There has been a decline of the PA Security Forces that has been accelerated by the fiscal crisis that began in the fall of 2012. With monthly salaries withheld or partially issued, many PA officers have stopped any semblance of work. With the consent of their commanders, the officers clock in and then go off to other jobs. This search for money has been exploited by Hamas, made rich by donors such as Iran and Qatar.
Numerous PA officers have been quietly working for Hamas, notably in its military wing, Izzadin Kassam.
Hamas penetration has been strong in several areas of the West Bank, particularly in the Hebron region, where senior PA intelligence officers are believed to be providing intelligence to Hamas.
Coupled with this is a new rapprochement process between the PA and Hamas, with talk of a unity government.
Separation between the PA and Hamas following the Gaza coup was never as complete as was popularly imagined. As early as 2008, public security minister Avi Dichter charged that the PA was committed to transferring roughly NIS 4 billion each year to Hamas to help pay the salaries of its workers and security officers. Abbas also arranged for the PA to pay for the electricity generated for the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.
Now there is evidence of Fatah- Hamas coordination in parts of the West Bank. The PA has lifted the ban against Hamas rallies, and Hamas has gained control of many West Bank mosques. Israel's intelligence community has determined that Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Mashaal has ordered the establishment of military cells to take over the West Bank.
What Israel now faces is a worstcase scenario; PA security forces have a history of turning on Israelis, and with the increased cooperation between the PA and Hamas, the likelihood of this happening again grows more likely. Statements of late by PA officials suggest such cooperation.
Former PA foreign minister Nabil Shaath, for example, has called for unity with Hamas that would "win further victories for us." With Hamas cooperation, he said the PA would escalate "the struggle against Israel" in 2013.
However, should there be a repeat of prior attacks by PA forces, bolstered by cooperation with Hamas, dealing with the situation will be far more difficult than it has been previously.
Now those PA forces are far better equipped and trained, thanks to a US policy that may have been illadvised from the outset.
The time has come for an evaluation of the impact of US aid to the PA Security Forces, however well intended.
