Morocco, often overlooked in the troubled aftermath of the Arab Spring, is actually among its most interesting countries -- precisely because it is now so quiet, after a few months of massive demonstrations two years ago. In response to those protests, King Muhammad VI moved with alacrity to offer a program of reforms. A new constitution, with some symbolic limits on his power, was approved by referendum in June 2011.
More practically, parliamentary elections in November of that year gave the prime ministership and lead government coalition role, for the first time, to a formerly opposition and avowedly Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD). Although turnout in both plebiscites was not very high -- around 50 percent by official estimates, less than half that by some unofficial ones -- they helped restore a sense of legitimacy and progress to Moroccan political life. Despite the accelerating turmoil in many other Arab states, Morocco largely calmed down.
The new constitution and accompanying regulations also afforded unprecedented official recognition to the country's Amazigh (Berber) culture and language. Around half of Morocco's people claim some connection to that ethnic identity, and it remains a very strong presence in the Rif and the Atlas mountainous regions of the country. A recent visit to Rabat revealed, startlingly, some street signs in the unique alphabet devised for that language and a television channel broadcasting all day only in its several distinct dialects, with Arabic subtitles for the uninitiated. In part as a result, the Mouvement Populaire party, which mainly represents the Rif Berbers, remains a staunch supporter of the current government.
Other steps were promised and a few delivered. Just last week, for example, the king endorsed and sent to parliament recommendations for limited judicial reform. And over the past two years, large-scale protests have not recurred. This relatively large yet largely poor kingdom, with a population of 33 million but none of the oil or gas riches of its Gulf Arab counterparts, appears to have found a formula for stability through gradual reform.
THE MAKHZEN: KING AND COMPANY
In practice, however, the Moroccan monarchy remains supreme so far. Even under the new constitution, the king retains the right to dismiss the parliament at will, along with control over the country's large and powerful military and security establishment. It is still against the law to insult the king; and some critical journalists, NGO activists, and demonstrators continue to be silenced, arrested, or beaten, even in the past two years. In addition, the royal establishment and entourage as a whole, or makhzen, as Moroccans call it, keeps a substantial measure of control or at least influence over many of the major levers of the Moroccan economy: phosphate and other mining, real estate, banking, insurance, foreign trade, transport, and more.
On a more personal level, King Muhammad VI still seems quite popular -- more so than any single political party or other leader, according to the few available polls on the subject, and perhaps especially among the nearly half of Moroccans who remain rural or illiterate. Besides the recent reforms and the promise of more, he continues to enjoy the aura of the changes he introduced in the first years after his accession in 1999, which softened the autocratic legacy of his father, Hassan II. He dismissed the veteran, widely feared interior minister Driss Basri; created a reconciliation and restitution mechanism for released political prisoners; and presided over a controversial but ultimately popular liberalization of the moudawwana, or Islamic personal status code.
One other key component of the king's authority is his reputation for remaining above the fray -- except on extraordinary occasions. He often appears in public and in the media, but usually only for brief, carefully scripted ceremonial or charitable events. He rarely travels far abroad, perhaps because his health has not been perfect, though he will turn only fifty years old this coming August. And he very seldom meets U.S. or other Western officials, delegating almost all such contacts to his advisors.
Those advisors are extraordinarily powerful, though their role is largely private and informal. For example, the PJD, which nominally runs the government, almost always accepts their ultimate authority even on Islamic issues or Morocco's ongoing tolerance for tourists' behavior. Right now, the innermost circle of palace advisors is reputed to include Fouad al-Himma, Yassine Mansouri, and Rushdie Chribi. A second circle is said to include Yasser Zenagui, Mounir Majdi, and the perennially influential Andre Azoulay. As always, however, a crucial feature of this arrangement is that all these names are subject to change without notice.
