There are no good options in Syria. No matter what happens, the current civil war has triggered divisions between Sunni, Alawite, Kurd, and Syria's smaller minorities that will take a decade or more to heal and leave lasting anger and hatred between Sunni and Alawite. The war has already spread to involve Lebanon and Iraq, unleashing a rebirth of sectarian tensions and conflict in each country. Worse, it has become linked to a religious war within Islam that increasingly pits Sunni against Shi'ite, and religious extremists against mainstream Islam, across the entire Islamic world.
It has led to Qatari, Saudi, Turkish, Jordanian, and UAE intervention, in terms of providing money, training, and weapons to given elements in the opposition, and to quiet-but increasingly active-covert support of some of these efforts by the United States, Britain, and France. Iran, Russia, and possibly China have supported Bashar al-Assad, along with Hezbollah.
The Cost of the Current Conflict to Syria and the Region
The end result is a proxy war without a clear strategic objective for most of the outside powers involved-with the exception of Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah, which can at least predict that any largely Sunni victory will have a negative impact on them regardless of which mix of Sunnis wins. No one else can really know even the near-term effects of Assad's fall or survival.
The human impact of the conflict has spilled over the borders of Turkey and Jordan and involved Israel in the Golan. A massive refugee problem has developed in every bordering state except Israel, and no one has a meaningful count of the internally displaced persons within Syria or the Syrians who have become the equivalent of destitute and insecure "refugees" in their own homes. There is no practical way to estimate the cost in terms of immediate economic suffering or the future impact on development in every possible area of economic activity and the costs in laying the educational and institutional groundwork for the next generation.
Efforts to unify the opposition and give it moderate leadership are certainly necessary, but no one should have illusions about the probable result. Decades of dictatorship, cronyism, and corruption ensure that today's Syrian opposition has no real practical background in politics, governance, and democracy. It has democratic voices, but these voices have no unity or power in a structure in which combat capability has become the real metric of status and success. Opposition to Assad is the only real element of unity, as factions emerge that range from Sunni Islamist extremists to minor warlords to leaders with the public image of leadership and command but no real following.
No one can predict which leader will survive, gain real power, or be able to move Syria back toward a pragmatic and unified course once Assad falls-and the odds are against one emerging in the first few years of the post-Assad struggle for power. It is easy to talk about unifying the opposition, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. There are many Syrians who want all this. In practice, however, the odds strongly favor years of instability and power struggles compounded by social fragmentation, widespread conflict, a crippled economy, and outside interference.
The Present "Least Bad" Option Is Not Good Enough to Succeed
All of these conflicting pressures, and the current and future divisions within the Syrian opposition, mean there is no good side to pick. The image of unity is not the reality. No one can now predict how deep the divisions in Syria will be once Assad falls, who and what will emerge in power, and what level of stability can be built up over time. The only thing that is now predictable is that the longer Assad lasts, the worse things are likely to get in every possible dimension. Every element of the present conflict is having a steadily more crippling effect and is more polarizing both within Syria and the region around it.
This confronts the United States with having to choose between "bad options" in finding better alternatives. The United States can only vaguely hope to shape or influence the post-Assad outcome over time. There is no predictable "end stage," and U.S. leverage will be limited regardless of the level of intervention it supports.
This partially justifies the current U.S. emphasis on working with the Arab Gulf states, Jordan, and Turkey, while aiding Israel in building up its ability to deal with Hezbollah and Iranian proxy attacks. As the New York Times and Washington Post have now made clear, the United States is indirectly providing arms, training, and intelligence support, as well as trying to create a more moderate opposition by supporting a "unified" opposition "government," favoring the more moderate opposition forces, and working with its Arab allies and Turkey to limit the flow of arms and money to the more extreme Sunni Islamist factions. In spite of press reports, the United States preserves a kind of "plausible deniability" in the process.
The United States is also creating a cadre within the State Department that can help the more moderate opposition elements learn how to act as responsible political parties, hold elections, govern, and move toward economic reform and development. The Obama administration is at least trying to cope with the reality that all forms of major counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and civil conflict do in fact involve "nation building"-and must find ways of helping to shape the future of Syria that do not involve the mindless waste and lack of planning and preparation that took place in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But, the current U.S. effort clearly cannot guarantee any rapid end to the worst of the fighting or an end to the Assad regime on a timely basis. The gains the rebels now make are too limited, too slow, and too divisive inside Syria and within the entire region. At their present pace, even an opposition "victory" may have a political and regional outcome that amounts to a strategic defeat.
The "Best" of the Other "Least Bad" Options: Giving the Opposition More Advanced Weapons
This does not mean that the United States has "good" military options for dealing with these problems, and it is quite clear that more sanctions and more calls for negotiations are not going to help. There are, however, some "least bad" options.
The quickest and least attributable way of trying to bring a more rapid end would be to allow our regional allies to supply advanced man-portable surface-to-air missiles and anti-armor guided weapons to the most moderate elements of the opposition forces.
This could deprive the pro-Assad forces of their ability to use fighters and helicopters, as well as reduce much of their advantage in urban warfare, where armored vehicles have to expose themselves at limited ranges. Add in transfers of mortars and tube artillery like the D-30s widely available in the region, and the Assad forces would lose much of their indirect fire advantage, as well.
