Nevertheless, despite the opposition's problems, Putin himself seems to take it seriously. "He truly got scared in late 2011," stated one former high official. "He is now taking revenge on everyone who made him scared: protesters, independent NGOs and elites of fragile loyalty." Close to 30 people are under investigation under the so-called Bolotnoye case - the criminal case against participants in the protests that took place on the eve of Putin's inauguration last spring; and more are being added by the day. Three NGOs have been labelled "foreign agents" under the laws adopted last summer. Alexei Navalny, probably the most prominent protest leader, is facing a court-case on politically motivated charges. Much-trumpeted, but selectively applied anti-corruption campaign is designed to keep in check the Kremlin-associated elites, many of whom had flirted - and a few even joined - the opposition.
In many ways, this is very much like what Putin did in the early 2000s when he had just come to power. Slowly, and using legal means, he took on the individuals and institutions that had dared to challenge him while showing the oligarchs that they could keep their property and freedom if they steered clear of politics. However, it is uncertain whether this old approach has the same chance to succeed. Unlike in the early 2000s, when the dissent really emanated from a limited number of prominent actors - mainly oligarchs and the media -, this time the protest mood is inside the society; the leaders only express it. Putting Alexei Navalny in prison will not make protests to go away, closing down NGOs will not change the fact that badly organised government is not able to provide the elementary services, thereby creating incentives for people to self-organise in order to have at least the basic things taken care of. Effectively, the way Putin addresses "the winter of dissent" amounts to shooting the messengers instead of dealing with the problem: corrupt and inefficient system of governing.
So far, the Putinist system has kept itself afloat thanks to permanent influx of oil- and gas-money. Now, however, the economy is showing signs of slowdown even before the decline in oil gas prices has properly kicked in. The pie is getting smaller; and there are painful dilemmas. There is urgent economic need to reform, but reforms would have some social cost, which - given the already unhappy population - is risky. To keep the social expenditure on its current level or increase it, one needs money, but money is hard to come buy if global oil and gas prices stay under the levels foreseen in the Russian budgets. To get the economy off its dependence on raw materials, Russia should modernise, but modernisation inevitably foresees some political reforms, as this presumes the cooperation from "creative classes," who are currently antagonised and contemplating emigration. Dealing with corruption truly, rather than selectively, would be a big step forward on the economic as well as domestic political front, but this would erode the very bases of the Putinist system: loyalty of the elites in exchange for the possibilities of self-enrichment. Putin is used to having it all: abundant economic as well as political resources have been at his disposal during his first two terms. Now, both of these resources are drying up, forcing him to choose between different constituencies, loyalties and priorities; even worldviews. Having it all is not possible any more; and the choices made at this junction will not only determine the lifespan of Putin's rule, but will also have meaningful implications for post-Putin Russia.
