Israel's long search for impregnable security in the region has in its own view been aided by the stability of neighbouring autocracie. Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, Jordan under King Hussein and now King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia under the House of Saud, and even Syria under Hafez and now Bashar Assad - all recognised the power of Israel and were all too aware of Israel's ultimate nuclear capability.
Israel was the regional superpower, even if that could never be acknowledged.
True, uncertainty in Lebanon (and to a degree over Gaza) remained an exception to the pattern, with Syria's support for Hizbollah a continuing irritation and Israel's failures against that movement in the conflict of 2006 a source of real concern. At the same time, the Assad regime's acceptance of the status quo over the strategically vital Golan heights was a reassurance, and overall - southern Lebanon and Gaza excepted - Israel's immediate position was secure.
In the two years since the Arab awakening, such certainty has eroded: notably with Egypt (and particularly Sinai) but now much more with Syria. There is an acute concern with the United Nations peacekeepers on the Golan heights, especially as Austria's government has warned that it might withdraw its significant contingent. Austrian units make up barely a third of the total UN force, but their commitment has been substantial and a pullout could encourage others to follow suit in a way that leads to the collapse of the operation.
The triple worry
More generally, Israel's attitude to the bitter civil war in Syria is rooted in three calculations: backing to any regime in Damascus that maintains stability, enduring antagonism to Bashar Assad's support for Hizbollah, and the need to keep the Golan heights within Israel's control.
Until recently Israel felt able to restrict Hizbollah, not least by air-strikes aimed at destroying munitions destined for Lebanon, and its anxiety over the Golan heights was limited. Two outcomes of the war were considered possible - either Syria's collapse and ensuing fragmentation and inherent weakness, or the regime's survival but in conditions where it was sapped of most of its strength.
Now, though, three awkward developments are causing considerable concern in Jerusalem. The first is that the Assad regime is proving surprisingly robust and is currently on the offensive. It has, in particular, a distinct chance of breaking some of the key supply-lines for the less Islamist rebels, with the possibility of weakening them to a point close to defeat (see David Hartwell, "Battle for Al-Qusayr highlights shift in Syrian conflict", Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 May 2013).
From Israel's perspective that would leave the more radical Islamist elements in control of much of Syria's north-east, including hydroelectric plants and oilfields. These elements would then pose an uncomfortable future threat to the Assad regime and even the possibility of Islamist pre-eminence. In turn that would in the short term strengthen the axis between Damascus and Hizbollah (whose units are now proving vital to current attempts to secure the city of Al-Qusayr).
