As I recently wrote, backing Syria's Al-Qaeda-affiliated rebels would be contrary to American interests; reports from Syria increasingly confirm this. The Sunni world has essentially declared war on Assad, the Alawi and those who stand with them -- namely, Christians and some of the Sunni elite. The vast resources of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states stand ready to provide aid and arms to extremists.
Perhaps the best argument against the Dayton model for Syria is the presence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates among the Sunni rebels. Of course, if this fact constitutes an argument against intervention, it would be an even stronger argument against arming Syria's rebels. As the administration's only course of action has been to arm the rebels, examining Dayton as a possible model for Syria is as good (or bad) an idea as any.
Applying the basic tenets of Dayton to Syria would look something like this:
- The international community, led by the U.S. and Russia, would outline the peace plan, which would include boundaries for three quasi-autonomous regions (Alawi, Sunni, and Kurdish); the establishment of a "zone of separation" (ZOS) between the warring factions; the resettlement of Syrian refugees who fled to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey into their respective regions; and the resettlement of some Syrians (either voluntarily or by compulsion) to their appropriate regional zone.
- The factions from Syria's civil war would be compelled to take their places at the negotiation table, where the particulars of the accord would be presented to them largely as a fait accompli, as they were at Dayton.
- NATO, Russia, and other members of the international peace-enforcing expedition would deploy to maintain the integrity of the ZOS, oversee resettlement and reintegration efforts, and provide stability until such time as regional elections are feasible.
This was, in brief, the formula that ultimately succeeded in Bosnia. But even if feasible, it would be immensely difficult to achieve.
As a young American soldier who was part of IFOR, I witnessed Holbrooke's plan implemented first hand. Forever seared in my memory is the Bosnian farmer in the Zone of Separation (ZOS) who set his home and farmland ablaze rather than see it handed over to a generational enemy. Difficult though it is to imagine, Syria is incomparably more volatile than Bosnia two decades ago; it is the focal point of a wider Sunni-Shia conflict, where Saudi Arabia and Iran -- and now America and Russia -- wage war by proxy.
Syria is beset with perils on all sides. Inaction protracts a grave humanitarian crisis and permits Iran and Hezbollah a greater foothold in Syria; supporting the rebels advances the strategic interests Al-Qaeda and Saudi-backed extremists. Syria has been reduced to barbarism -- quite literally, to cannibalism and now the beheading of Christians. An international peace-enforcing expedition, of the kind that brought peace to Bosnia in 1996, may offer a viable solution for Syria. Whatever the faults of Richard Holbrooke, the administration could benefit from his force of will today -- rather than prolonging conflict by equipping America's enemies.
