Obama has precipitated a crisis with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the latter's offer of temporary asylum to National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden. But what are the administration's larger goals vis-a-vis Russia? Does it see Russia as a potential balancer against China? In that vein, could Russia also be a partner in easing the war in Syria? What about Russia vis-a-vis Iran; or vis-a-vis Central and Eastern Europe and beyond, where Russia is attempting to advance a zone of influence from the Baltics to the Caucasus? Because there has not appeared to be sufficient coherency in America's Russia policy in the first place, the U.S.-Russia dust-up over Snowden seems instigated by Obama toward no larger plan or purpose.
Secretary of State Kerry has started peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians. When Kissinger engaged in Arab-Israeli diplomacy it was with a larger purpose in mind: to create a bridgehead for more U.S. power in the region in order to combat the Soviet Union. And Kissinger kept briefing journalists to that effect. Kerry, on the other hand, appears a loner, taking few into his confidence, even as his mission regarding a larger geopolitical strategy in the Middle East is insufficiently clear. It seems as if he is engaging in the so-called peace process only because it happens to be an opportunity that presents itself at the moment. There may be subtle shifts underway in the region, like the weakening of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt -- and the attendant deterioration of Egypt's relationship with Gaza -- that have presented Kerry with an opportunity. But these can prove ephemeral, absent a comprehensible geopolitical strategy that, even if one exists, is a mystery beyond the administration.
Meanwhile, the first-term "pivot" to Asia undertaken by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has faded into the background, even as the strategic and diplomatic breakthrough achieved with India during George W. Bush's administration appears to have languished somewhat. Nobody is telling either the elite or the public how India, the Asia-Pacific region, Russia, the Middle East, and so forth all fit together into a vigorous policy formulation.
Without a policy conception it is harder to project power because a conception focuses your energies in a way that provides additional leverage. Moreover, in a media age especially, power is partly the power of ideas. And so without ideas you have less power. That is why a successful foreign policy is always more than the sum of its parts: with Obama, the disparate parts are all we have.
And so Obama, because he has no overriding vision, is completely dependent on events falling his way. If the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks engineered by Kerry founder, if Iran's new president proves a disappointment or a mere delayer, if there is a particularly significant terrorist attack, Obama will be remembered as a forgettable, ineffectual foreign policy president. Contrarily, look at President Woodrow Wilson: he may have failed in his vision to spread democracy, freedom and self-determination, but because he had an original conception he continues to cast a shadow on American foreign policy. Not so Obama.
The world is a tough place. To wit, complex, populous and strife-torn Islamic societies are not amenable to American grand conceptions. But in every era there must be a specific moral and geopolitical logic that governs America's approach to the world. And that logic must be built out of what Washington will do, and can do, not only built out of what it won't do.
How to employ geopolitics toward a moral strategy? That is the question that every administration has faced since America became a world power at the turn of the 20th century. The Obama administration has not adequately answered it yet.
