The challenge is threefold. First, such a belief in the post-power essence of the EU is increasingly less appealing and less popular. Observers of European politics describe with some alarm a reassertion of "nationalism," the ghost that haunts Europe and that should have disappeared under the blue EU flag. The EU is becoming associated with unemployment and lack of legitimacy, rather than with the avoidance of another world war.
Second, Germany may not want to lead EU forward. It simply costs a lot of money that the German electorate is not willing to front any more. It is therefore not inconceivable to see Germany wanting to shed the more burdensome countries in Southern Europe, and rearrange the euro-zone as well as the EU into something quite different from its current institutional setting and from its original idea. A smaller "Northern" core, sharing the same currency, may become a reality out of fiscal necessity. Moreover, a German leadership is unlikely to result in a more coherent European strategic actor because of the reluctance of Berlin to exercise a large role on the world scene. As a keen observer of European politics notes, "This avoidance has become the key feature of the German foreign and security policy debate. German dodging has always been a nuisance in Europe. Now, with Germany as Europe's indispensable nation-and with Europe's erstwhile strategy champions lost in self-absorption-Germany's evasion has become a geopolitical problem. More than that, it is a scandal. And it won't end anytime soon. Germany, Europe's swing state, prefers to continue its strategic slumber."
Third, other European countries may not want Germany to lead Europe. The calls for a more active German leadership are not uniform and unopposed. Indeed, the fear of a German domination of European politics and economics is quite pervasive, if less vocal. By and large, worries about a German hegemony over the continent are quickly dismissed as ahistorical, overly alarmist, and inappropriate in a EU context. But it is too easy to discount such worries. Nobody really expects a German military resurgence, and the exercise of power occurs in a consultative fashion through economic and financial influence. Nonetheless, the worry is that in the end Berlin is imposing policies, which, albeit necessary, carry little support and legitimacy in the target countries (to wit, Greece) - and the result may be a swelling of anti-German feelings.
An American push to support German leadership in Europe is, thus, a desperate move that is highly unlikely to reap many strategic benefits. In fact, it is upsetting traditional partnerships, in particular with the UK, and has been received quite coldly in Germany itself.
More broadly and most importantly, the US should cease its public support for the continued efforts to keep the EU afloat, efforts that are predicated on greater centralization of the powers in Bruxelles. We have limited influence over the internal dynamics and, above all, we are taking sides in an intra-European debate that is far from settled. Threatening a good ally, Great Britain, that were it to leave the EU it would not be included in new trade negotiations is shortsighted and counterproductive. Such a posture allies the US not with Europe, but with one side of a vocal internal debate in Europe. It puts Washington together with Bruxelles, and alienates half of Europeans. And it deprives us of strong allies within Europe.
A partnership with Europe does not necessarily mean a partnership with the EU. On the contrary, to seek a greater relationship with the EU, to the detriment of strong ties with individual countries, weakens the US because its counterpart, the EU, is a political entity that cannot protect its own citizens, is creating deep tensions among its states, and is contributing to an upheaval of the continent's equilibrium of power.
The success of the EU is not inevitable. We should be agnostic about the future of the EU and ought to be open to alternative ways of pursuing the continued goals we have in Europe. Whether some of these ways may involve a British exit, or a geographic consolidation of the Eurozone, or even in the most extreme and unlikely scenario the splintering of the EU project, Washington ought to be prepared. As Paul Johnson observed recently, "U.S. policy ought to take note of the general air of hostility toward Brussels. Mr. Obama faces the prospect of Britain leaving the EU and of France, Germany, Italy and Spain all weakening their links. This will have little effect on American prosperity, but it is a return to realism that Washington should welcome, if quietly."
A Europe that is free, strong, and whole is not necessarily based on the EU. Bilateral relations are not passé nor ineffective, and should take precedence over the mirage of a unified, multilateral Europe. Our goals are still there, and rightly so, but the policies need to be adjusted.
